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Abstract 
Microenterprises and new knowledge are regarded as important growth drivers today. The objective of 
the thesis is to consider whether the existing theories take the microenterprises and new knowledge 
into account in the assumptions and in the models themselves. The traditional neoclassical growth 
theory by Solow and the more modern one, the endogenous growth theory are chosen as the theories 
to begin with. It is noticed that neither of the theories take into account the growth drivers proposed by 
literature and empirical research. As a result, the modified endogenous growth theory, the endogenous 
growth theory of entrepreneurship is introduced and discussed in detail.  
The endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship assumes that as a consequence of new, spilled over 
knowledge, entrepreneurial opportunities are created. Thus the model makes the important 
assumptions that new knowledge needs a mechanism by which it transforms into opportunities, 
commercialized products and ultimately into profits and economic growth. The mechanism is a new 
enterprise. 
However the endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship depicts the real growth factors better than 
its predecessors, the assumption underlying the model that microenterprises are the growth factor 
brings new deficiencies. The model does not take into account the decision of becoming an 
entrepreneur and the factors affecting that decision. The most important deficiency is that the financial 
situation is extremely difficult for microenterprises. The traditional lending institutions, banks, and the 
formal venture capitalists refuse to lend capital to such high risk ventures. As the thesis proposes, 
business angels are usually the only option for the microenterprises to receive investment capital that 
they need for growth. It could be advantageous for the endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship 
to take into account also the financial situation of the microenterprises since it affects the 
establishment, success, growth and disappearance of such enterprises.  
The thesis proposes that informal venture capitalists are the main source of financing for 
microenterprises and that the venture capital markets are inefficient since demand exceeds supply 
clearly. Actually, the findings are so convincing that the thesis proposes that often without business 
angel capital, microenterprises cannot grow and thus much growth potential also at the economy level 
is wasted. Business angels clearly contribute to economic growth.  
The final objective is to propose that the hands-on involvement of business angels actually enhances the 
growth rates of the investee microenterprises. The source of the value added is the business angels’ 
accumulated human and social capital. By participating with the investee enterprise, business angels 
perform particular value adding roles which increase the firm growth rate even more. The basis for the 
argumentation is on the notion that the new entrepreneurs lack all kinds of economical skills; financial, 
sales and marketing, management, strategic viewpoints as well important networks, among others. 
 
Keywords: economic growth, business angel, venture capital, entrepreneurship, innovations 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 The connection between innovation oriented new enterprises, informal 
capital and economic growth 
During the first three quarters of the last century, a prevailing belief was that economies of scale and 
scope present in production, distribution, management, and research and development of a firm led to 
increasing firm size (Carree and Thurik 2005). In addition, the growing but relatively low level of 
economic development and high price elasticities that were followed by price competition, favored large 
scale production. Statistical evidence from OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) countries clearly shows a tendency towards an increasing presence and role of large firms 
during that period (Carree and Thurik 2005; Audretsch et al. 2002). Entrepreneurship and small firms on 
the other hand decreased in importance and number despite they were driving entrepreneurship, 
income and employment in the first decades of the last century (Audretsch and Thurik 2000; Carree and 
Thurik 2005). During that time, Schumpeter (1934) wrote The Theory of Economic Growth which already 
then emphasized the importance of entrepreneurship as the prime cause for economic development. 
Schumpeter argued that new enterprises exploit creative destruction which relates to introducing new 
innovations and making existing production methods and processes obsolete (Carree and Thurik 2005). 
Creative destruction is the main characteristic of what has been called the Schumpeter Mark 1 regime, 
and also nowadays, it is one of the drivers of economic development in the endogenous growth 
theories.   
The main argument in the thesis is that the traditional macroeconomic growth theories that explained 
growth for most of the last century do not any longer completely capture the essential drivers of 
economic growth. The thesis proposes that the most essential growth drivers, that are not included in 
the traditional growth theories, are innovative microenterprises and the utilization of new knowledge. 
The traditional growth models explain growth with scale economies, international trade and (product) 
differentiation but also with technological change and productivity. Thus the traditional neoclassical 
growth theories fail to take into account the growth small microenterprises contribute. In addition, 
according to literature and empirical evidence, it is widely recognized that much of the economic growth 
cannot be explained by the existing theories.  
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By utilizing new knowledge and transforming it into commercial opportunities, microenterprises grow 
and employ citizens. With proper financial and professional aid such companies can experience two-
figure growth easily, given that the business idea is proper. In absolute terms, such a growth is 
unsubstantial at economy level, but when the whole small firm sector is taken into account, the 
contribution to growth and employment could be substantial. In fact, in the future, the microenterprise 
sector may be the most relevant source of economic growth, if supported properly. 
Why is it so important to address economic growth? The financial crises and the economic downturn 
that followed made national economies to suffer great reduces in the levels of gross domestic product 
(GDP). In addition, the gross domestic product growth rates have been steadily decreasing also in steady 
economic conditions in the developed countries. The tendency seems to be clearly towards a low GDP 
growth era. Also, due to the financial crisis and economic downturn, governments were forced to take 
on new debt which has to be paid back in the future. In addition, the dependency ratio is getting worse: 
in the near future, the amount of Finnish nationals that are retired will be larger than the amount of 
Finnish nationals that belong to the working group. The concerns about the Finnish welfare state and 
economic growth are distinct. It is important to be able to correctly measure economic growth and its 
drivers. Without a thorough understanding of the factors that create growth, it is impossible to support 
growth and in worst case, policy implication could unintentionally disrupt and prevent the growth 
drivers from acting favorably and in even worst case, altogether.  
The macroeconomic theories have already been modified to better describe national growth.  For 
example Audretsch and Thurik (2004) introduced two broad concepts of economic organization: 
Managed and Entrepreneurial Economies. The researchers proposed that the economic dimension were 
no longer dominated by scale economies and large companies but by entrepreneurship, which is driven 
by knowledge, technology, innovations and opportunities.  Managed Economy theories and the whole 
viewpoint flourished for most of the last century while Entrepreneurial Economy emerged when it was 
finally noted that the assumptions behind Managed Economy approach did no longer hold for the 
changed circumstances prevailing in today’s reality.  
There is vast amount of literature pointing the connection between entrepreneurship and economic 
growth. For example Engel (2002) researched a series of studies which ultimately affirmed a statistical 
regularity between various measures of entrepreneurial activity, most typically startup rates, and 
economic growth. Similar arguments are presented also in Finland. As stated by the Confederation of 
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Finnish Industries (2008), it is essential for the growth and development of national economies that 
there are firms which expand, regenerate and employ citizens. Through these activities enterprises 
create welfare both in a firm and a national level. Nations’ dynamics need innovations and productivity, 
that is growth enterprises.  
The increased importance of young enterprises creates also problems: they cannot grow without capital. 
Such enterprises do not have unutilized capital since they are so small and young, at the startup or seed 
stage, that they cannot possibly have acquired capital by themselves. The business is only starting, in 
many cases there are just narrow income streams and no physical or financial assets that would secure 
bank loans. Formal venture capitalists and institutions as well the traditional lenders, commercial banks, 
do not invest in such a small companies. Also the young enterprises are so risky that the investors have 
to be prepared to lose everything they have invested. Neither bank nor formal venture capitalist will 
accept that. So there seems to be an insuperable problem: an enterprise that seeks growth and has the 
potential to grow cannot do it since there seems to be no institution that would lend the necessary 
capital for the enterprise to grow. Except for one: business angels. 
Business angels are high net worth individuals (HNWI). They have a history as entrepreneurs or former 
high end managers in large companies. Through successful business lives, business angels have earned 
enormously wealth. They are prepared and willing to invest in those small risky enterprises. As former 
entrepreneurs or successful managers, they want to help the younger generations of entrepreneurs to 
achieve what they have achieved, and they are also prepared to carry the risks the investments bring. 
Usually business angels invest both capital and time, and they require a share of the enterprise in 
return. Business angels are often found from formal positions in management teams or in boards of 
directors in the investee enterprises.  
As the thesis will argue, business angels are the main source of capital for growing microenterprises. In 
the thesis the argument will be made that without business angel financing, many potential growth 
companies would not be able to exercise their full potential in creating economic growth.  
In addition to investing capital, business angels contribute their accumulated human and social capital. 
Entrepreneurs are often former engineers, scientists or other suchlike employees that have had access 
to firm specific new knowledge. When such an individual establishes an own firm he lacks numerous 
competencies. These include management, finance, sales and marketing, distribution and network of 
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connections, among others. Due to the characteristics of business angels and the value adding 
contributions they perform, business angels are able to provide the entrepreneur such knowledge and 
connection they are short of. In fact, the involvement of an angel investor with the enterprise 
contributes to higher growth rate at the firm level, and it can be argued, that also at the economy level.   
1.2 Research problem and the frame of reference 
The objective of the thesis is to propose that the traditional growth theories fail to explain economic 
growth in its entirety. The argument is made that innovative microenterprises that utilize new 
knowledge are the growth drivers today and that they are not included in the traditional growth models. 
The objective is also to propose that growing microenterprises are short of necessary growth capital and 
that business angels are often the only institution that provides them capital. In addition, the thesis 
argues that by both providing capital and time business angels contribute to higher firm growth rates. 
The thesis is a literature survey by its nature since there will be no empirical part. The argumentation is 
based partly on comparative analysis. In the second chapter, the evaluation of the macroeconomic 
theories is based on empirical results concerning the economic growth drivers and mechanisms 
proposed by literature and empirical research. The rest of the thesis is based on comparative analysis. 
The preference for anonymity by business angels creates some short falls in research in the area. 
Empirical studies concentrating on the economic impact business angels have are limited, since there is 
no means by to which identify either firms that receive angel financing or the business angels 
themselves. Business angels do not need to identify themselves or publicly announce their activities. 
Also, research in the field is young and the theoretical modeling of business angel investment process as 
well the frame of reference lacks altogether. Due to the preceding argumentation, it is out of the scope 
of the thesis to conduct empirical research on the micro and macro level effects business angels have. 
 1.3 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. The second chapter discusses and presents the neoclassical growth 
theory by Solow as well the more modern theory of endogenous growth. As will be argued in the 
chapter, the basic endogenous growth theory does not explain economic growth properly, since 
entrepreneurship is not build in the model. Thus the second chapter ends with a presentation of the 
endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship which is a modification of the basic endogenous growth 
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theory. In the second chapter, some important concepts that closely relate to the growth drivers today 
are also discussed. 
The third section introduces growth enterprises themselves and clearly presents their need for growth 
capital. In the section I will also demonstrate the venture capital markets in Europe and Finland. In 
addition, the third chapter presents business angel operations in the venture capital market and clearly 
demonstrates how the informal venture capitalists are the main capital providers for microenterprises. 
The third chapter concludes with a thorough presentation of the business angels themselves.  
In the fourth chapter, business angel investment process is briefly discussed. More attention is directed 
to the presentation of the value adding roles that literature suggests business angels are performing. 
The fifth chapter presents micro and macro level empirical evidence that such enterprises that are 
financed with either business angel capital or formal venture capital experience higher growth rates 
than similar enterprises financed by any other institution, measured with almost any relevant meter.  
The sixth section presents a summary of the relevant results proposed in the thesis. 
1.4 Key concepts 
Entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurship is the manifested ability and willingness of individuals, on their 
own or in teams, within or outside existing organizations, to perceive and create new economic 
opportunities, whether they are new products or production methods, new organizational themes or 
product market combinations. They introduce their ideas in the market, in the face of uncertainty and 
other obstacles, by making decisions on locations and the use of resources and institutions (definition 
inspired by Hébert and Link 1989; Bull and Willard 1993; Lumpkin and Dess 1996 and presented by 
Wennekers and Thurik 1999, among many others).  
A growth enterprise: An enterprise is defined as a growth company if the annual growth rate is at least 
10%. Usually the growth figures are measured from turnover and from the total number of employees. 
Microenterprise: An enterprise that employs less than 10 people. 
When the microenterprises are discussed in the thesis, the objective is to include in the discussion such 
companies that are innovative, growing and technology oriented. Such enterprises create dynamics in 
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economies and they exploit new knowledge and innovations which ultimately create new enterprises 
and thus economic growth.  
Seed stage enterprise: A company is defined to be at the seed stage when there exists just the business 
idea but it is not exactly commercialized yet. The idea is being developed and researched further as well 
sized up.  
Startup enterprise: A startup company concentrates on product development and premarketing. The 
products or services are not yet sold and thus the company is not creating profits. 
Expansion stage enterprise: At this stage a company is already established and has internal financing. 
Products and/or services are sold, the company may or may not be profitable and it requires capital to 
grow and expand. 
Business angel: Business angel is an individual who acts alone or in a formal or informal syndicate and 
invests his own money directly in an unquoted business in which there is no family connection. After 
making the investment, business angel often takes an active involvement in the business by for example 
acting as an advisor or a member in the board of directors. Business angels are high net worth 
individuals and thus they have sufficiently disposable wealth to make such high risk investments. 
Formal and informal capital market: Informal capital market consists of business angels and friends 
and family investors (some studies do not include friends and family in this definition). Informal venture 
capitalists operate in informal capital market and an overarching feature is that they invest their own 
money, whether earned or inherited. All the other financial intermediaries that provide private equity 
financing, such as venture capital funds, banks and insurance companies, make up the formal venture 
capital market. A distinguishing feature is that formal venture capitalists invest third party money, that is 
capital not their own.  
Endogenous growth theory: The endogenous growth theory is built on some of the assumptions 
determining neoclassical growth models. The theory differs from the neoclassical theories by the 
assumption that knowledge is produced in firms as any other good and is thus endogenously modeled. 
The endogenous growth theory assumes that new knowledge produced in incumbent enterprises spills 
over automatically and all firms in a specified geographical area can utilize it. 
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Endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship: The endogenous growth theory of 
entrepreneurship differs from the basic theory of endogenous growth by many aspects but the most 
important is the assumption that knowledge creates entrepreneurial opportunities. The preceding 
argument is based on the assumption that entrepreneurship is an endogenous response to the 
incomplete commercialization of new knowledge and thus without entrepreneurship, much of new 
knowledge would be wasted. As a consequence one of the founding assumptions is that in societies 
there has to be economic agents that take advantage of new knowledge, commercialize it and profit 
from it. The model also assumes that there is a country (or region) specific knowledge filter which 
determines the country’s ability to utilize the produced knowledge.  
2. The connection between entrepreneurship and economic growth 
In this chapter I give a brief presentation of the neoclassical growth theories. I will make the arguments 
that propose why these theories fail to capture economic growth today, especially in developed 
countries. The chapter continues with a thorough presentation of the more representative theory: the 
theory of endogenous growth. Nevertheless the theory is advancement from the neoclassical growth 
theories, empirical evidence proposes that the basic endogenous growth theory fails to take into 
account the growth drivers, entrepreneurs. According to empirical evidence, the endogenous growth 
theory does not explain the witnessed growth in nations and for that reason modified models are 
emerging. In the thesis, I present the endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship.  
Before the actual presentation of the growth theories is given, I discuss some important concepts.  
2.1 From Managed Economy to Entrepreneurial Economy 
Audretsch and Thurik (2001 and 2004) among others, present the concepts of Managed and 
Entrepreneurial Economies. According to the researchers, Managed Economy flourished for most of the 
last century. The outputs consisted mainly of manufactured products and the inputs of traditional 
production factors: labor, capital and land. A number of studies indicate that assumptions and theories 
defining Managed Economy conditions did no longer correspond to the real conditions in the late 20th 
century. Academics noticed that there had been changes in the economic environment, such as the 
information and communication technology (ICT) revolution, and globalization. Also the academics 
found that in the countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
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(OECD), there has been a structural shift from large companies competing through mass production, 
product differentiation and economies of scale towards smaller companies relying on knowledge, 
initiative and flexibility. Thus the OECD countries went through a transition from Managed to 
Entrepreneurial Economy between mid-1970 and the early 1990s (Acs 1996 & 1999, Acs and Audretsch, 
2001, Audretsch and Thurik 2001, Karlsson et al. 2004, Verheul et al. 2003, among others). 
Audretsch and Thurik (2001, 2004) noted that in the last twenty years of the 20th century, the joint 
effect of globalization and the information and communication technology revolution extremely 
reduced the cost of shifting both capital and information out of the high cost locations of Europe and 
the United States into low-cost locations around the world. Routinized tasks that had been performed in 
high-cost locations were no longer compatible with the low-cost locations especially in East-Asian and 
South-American countries. According to the researchers, as a result, in high-cost locations the 
comparative advantage shifted to knowledge-based activities that cannot be transferred around the 
world without a significant cost.  
Knowledge as an input in production is inherently different from the more traditional inputs: land, 
capital and labor. Knowledge is characterized by high uncertainty, high asymmetries across people and it 
is expensive to transact. The response to a trend that proposed knowledge to be the main source of 
comparative advantage is the Entrepreneurial Economy (Audretsch and Thurik 2001, 2004). 
According to Audretsch and Thurik (2001, 2004), the model of Entrepreneurial Economy is based on 
elements such as flexibility, turbulence, diversity, creativity and novelty, and new forms of linkages and 
clustering. Both the Managed Economy and the Entrepreneurial Economy models explain economic 
growth, but the foundations for the growth vary substantially between the two. In the Managed 
Economy, economies experience growth through stability, specialization, homogeneity, scale, certainty 
and predictably. On the contrary, the above mentioned elements, flexibility, turbulence, diversity, 
novelty, innovation, linkages and clustering drive growth in the Entrepreneurial Economy model 
(Audretsch and Thurik, 2004).  
Thus as a result, the two models are extremely different. One fundamental difference is the treatment 
of entrepreneurship. According to Thurik (2007), an important distinction is that under the model of 
Managed Economy, firm failure is viewed negatively and it represents a drain on society’s resources. 
Also in the model, resources are not invested in high-risk ventures. On the contrary, in the 
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Entrepreneurial Economy firm failure is seen as an experiment, an attempt to walk into a new direction 
in an inherently risky environment (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). Thus the process of searching for new 
ideas is accompanied by failure. The researchers propose that an externality of failure is learning which 
should be anything but negative feature, as viewed in Managed Economy. In a similar fashion, the 
virtues of long-term relationships, stability and continuity under the model of the Managed Economy 
change to flexibility, change, and turbulence in the model of Entrepreneurial Economy. A liability in 
Managed Economy is, in some cases, a virtue in Entrepreneurial Economy (Thurik 2007). 
To sum up, the neoclassical growth theories that will be discussed below represent and are related to 
Managed Economy. The growth drivers in the neoclassical models are scale economies, mass production 
and product differentiation, all which actually grew economies in the last century. However, the world 
and economies are changed, and today the growth drivers are much different. As discussed above, 
innovation, change, flexibility and turbulence can be viewed as the growth factors today and those are 
not the virtues Managed Economy theories take advantage of. Thus the defining assumptions of the 
theory depict wrong reality. The building blocks of the Entrepreneurial Economy model make it 
representative for the current economic conditions. Also the depicted growth drivers are such elements 
that are usually related to entrepreneurship. Thus it can be argued that the endogenous growth theories 
that take into account entrepreneurship represent the Entrepreneurial Economy model.  
2.2 Entrepreneurship 
 2.2.1 The definition of entrepreneurship 
The reintroduction of entrepreneurship into mainstream economics was made by Baumol in 1968. Since 
the reintroduction, the role and importance of entrepreneurship in the research on economic growth 
has increased.  
 
Carree and Thurik (2002) define entrepreneurship essentially as a behavioral characteristic of a person. 
Entrepreneurship is not an occupation and entrepreneurs are not a well-defined occupational class of 
persons (Carree and Thurik, 2002). Following Hébert and Link (1989), Bull and Willard (1993), 
Wennekers and Thurik (1999) and Lumpkin and Dess (1996), Carree and Thurik (2002) give the following 
definition for entrepreneurship:  
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 “Entrepreneurship is the manifested ability and willingness of individuals, on their own, in teams, within 
 and outside existing organizations to perceive and create new economic opportunities (new products, 
 new production methods, new organizational schemes and new product-market combinations), and to 
 introduce their ideas in the market, in the face of uncertainty and other obstacles, by making decisions on 
 location, form and the use of resources and institutions”.  
 
 
There are three entrepreneurial roles that define entrepreneurship. They were emphasized by 
Schumpeter, Kirzner and Knight (Carree and Thurik 2002, among many others). First is the role of 
innovator that especially Schumpeter used to draw in discussion. Originally depicted by Schumpeter 
“new combinations we call enterprise; the individuals whose function it is to carry them out we call 
entrepreneurs” (Schumpeter 1934; 74). The second role addresses pursuing profit opportunities: 
entrepreneurs combine resources to fulfill currently unsatisfied needs or to improve market 
inefficiencies or deficiencies. Carree and Thurik (2002) label the role as Kirznerian entrepreneurship. For 
the third, there is the role that assumes risk associated with uncertainty (Carree and Thurik, 2002, label 
it as Knightian entrepreneurship). Carree and Thurik (2002) argue that if a person introduces a new 
product or starts a new enterprise it can be interpreted as an entrepreneurial act in terms of all the 
three roles: the person is an innovator who has perceived a profit opportunity which has been 
unnoticed until now and he takes the risk that the new venture or product is a failure. 
 
Entrepreneurs take advantage of new knowledge and innovations and turn them into new enterprises. 
As Carree and Thurik (2002) following Lumpkin and Dess (1996) propose, management literature takes a 
broad view on entry. The management literature states that new entry can be accomplished by entering 
new or established markets with new or existing goods and services. For entrepreneurs to create growth 
they cannot mimic smallness (Carree and Thurik 2002), that is entrepreneurs have to launch a new 
venture; a new startup firm that takes advantage of new innovations. These are essential definitions for 
the below discussed endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship and for the whole thesis. 
 2.2.2 Causes for the birth of new enterprises 
Audretsch et al. (2006) identify new knowledge and ideas as the source of entrepreneurship. They 
propose that new ideas and knowledge are created in one context and used in another. In practice, this 
could mean that incumbent firms create knowledge by investing in research and development but are 
either unable or unwilling to commercialize the new information. Audretsch et al. (2006) argue that the 
mechanism for recognizing new opportunities and actually implementing them by starting a new firm 
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involves knowledge spillovers. The organization that creates the new knowledge is not the same firm 
that commercializes it and actually profits from it: it is the new firm.  
Second factor that generates new enterprises is entrepreneurship capital. The more there are 
enterprises the more there is competition. According to Thurik (2007), competition advances knowledge 
externalities more than local monopolies. He argues that local competition does not however refer to 
competition within product markets as traditionally proposed by the industrial organization literature. 
Rather the competition refers to new ideas embodied in persons. The increasing amount of firms and 
the diversity among them enhances competition for new ideas. Greater competition across firms 
facilitates the entry of new firms that specialize in a particular new product niche and then increase the 
variety of firms in a specific geographic area. Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that an 
increase in the competition within a city, as measured by the number of enterprises, is accompanied by 
higher growth performance of that city (Glaeser et al. 1992 and Feldman and Audretsch, 1999). Also 
there has been a series of theoretical arguments suggesting that the degree of diversity, as opposed to 
homogeneity, will influence the growth potential of a geographic environment.  
The third factor is private equity. Popov and Roosenboom (2009) argue that there are two main 
mechanisms by which private equity should lead to greater amounts of new enterprises. First, potential 
entrepreneurs may anticipate the future need for capital (an entrepreneur anticipates that the firm will 
for example grow in the future). Thus, potential entrepreneurs establish firms only if they are 
reasonably sure that they will obtain financing also in the future.  
For the second, firms may be engaged in entrepreneurial spawning: former employees of publicly traded 
companies start their own businesses. According to Popov and Roosenboom (2009), large, established 
firms are incapable of adopting radical new technologies since they would disrupt the established way of 
organizing business. Stein (2002) on the other hand argues that firms are unable to evaluate new 
disruptive technologies since they do not relate directly to the current business. The adoption of new 
technology could also lead to a decline in the productivity of the existing business.  Thus the employees 
of large firms’ value new technologies and knowledge more than the incumbent companies that have 
produced them. Employees may then decide to quit and establish own firms to utilize the new 
inventions. Thus there has to be proper amounts of private equity available in the markets for the 
former employees to acquire in order to be able start their own businesses.  
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The above discussed factors can be bounded together. Knowledge that is created in incumbent firms is 
not utilized completely and thus there exists loose unexploited information. The unexploited 
information creates niches in the markets and new enterprises are established to take use of it. The 
number of firms is increased and the competition tightened in specific product markets or geographical 
areas. 
 2.2.3 Economic knowledge 
Audretsch et al. (2006) propose that knowledge has some important properties. It is non-excludable and 
non-rivalry. As a factor of production, knowledge is different from physical capital and labor. The impact 
knowledge has on economic growth is endogenous in the endogenous growth theories discussed below 
compared to the exogenous impact in for example the neoclassical growth theory also discussed later 
on. The marginal productivity of knowledge does not diminish as it becomes available to more users and 
thus growth can go on indefinitely (Audretsch et al. 2006).  
Another property of knowledge is that some of it is not diffused in the economy. All knowledge is not a 
given or free good at everyone’s disposal (Acs et al. 2003). Only a few know about a particular scarcity, a 
new invention or a particular resource that is not yet being utilized. This is especially true for the 
knowledge created within firms. Following this discovery, Acs et al. (2003) propose that knowledge is 
idiosyncratic because it is acquired through individuals’ circumstances that include occupation, on-the-
job routines, social relationships and daily life.  
Acs et al. (2003) define the term economic knowledge (also called capitalized knowledge) as knowledge 
that is produced by incumbent firms, universities and other knowledge producing institutions and is of 
value for economical purposes. Economically relevant knowledge differs from the other types of 
knowledge by its importance in creating economic growth and opportunities.  
Economically relevant knowledge obviously and in many aspects differs from traditional knowledge. The 
economic agents take advantage of the rare factor of production and turn it into financial gain. The 
channel by how it is utilized is always unique and ranges from new technologies, production methods, 
products, variations in existing products and so on (Acs et al. 2003).  
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 2.2.4. The lack of entrepreneurship and its effects on economic growth 
In this section I briefly present a microeconomic perspective how the lack of entrepreneurship affects 
economic growth. In coming sections macroeconomic theories concerning the same matter are 
discussed.  
According to Carree and Thurik (2002), a simple microeconomic model depicts the crucial factors leading 
from entrepreneurship to economic growth. A fundamental assumption is that entrepreneurs share the 
above discussed Kirznerian and Knightian roles. 
By assuming two local markets (i and j), a homogenous good, price elasticity equal to unity and a 
Cournot oligopoly1, it can be proven that the lack of Kirznerian and Knightian entrepreneurship leads to 
lower output. The equations determining the model are: 
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 is the total demand by consumers,  the profit maximizing function (β depicts variable costs and α 
fixed costs, both are assumed to be identical across firms) and   is the function depicting the output 
levels per firm. The cost functions are assumed to be identical across firms and thus also the output 
functions are identical. Let’s assume there are  firms in market x. Then the equilibrium market price, 
Cournot equilibrium output and equilibrium profit function are, respectively 
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There is equilibrium across regions if entrepreneurs in both regions earn same profits. The equilibrium 
condition is important since it assures maximum total output for the two markets given a certain fixed 
number of entrepreneurs, N. 
The combined output is 
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1
Cournot oligopoly assumes that the enterprises decide the production amounts simultaneously so that they do 
not take into account the reactions by competitors when changing the output level . The equilibrium price is 
then not decided by the entrepreneurs themselves but rather is determined in the market. 
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In the basic model, there exists a critical profit level, &, that the entrepreneurs seek in order to receive 
a certain level of compensation for their efforts. It is assumed that if the profit level decreases below the 
critical level entrepreneurs will exit the market until the profit level reaches the critical level again. Also, 
if the profit level exceeds the critical level, more entrepreneurs will enter the market and the increased 
competition will eventually push the profit level back to the critical level.  According to Carree and 
Thurik (2002), an important determinant of the critical profit level is the compensation entrepreneurs 
demand for the risk they face. 
For the presentation to yield useful results, the following is assumed. In one of the local markets, i or j, 
there are too many entrepreneurs and correspondingly, in the remaining local market there are too few 
entrepreneurs. It follows that the combined output is not at the optimal level. The entrepreneurs are 
not alert to the prevailing market conditions and there is lack of Kirznerian entrepreneurship (the 
entrepreneurs are not actively pursuing profit opportunities).  
Also increases in the risk aversion lead to an output loss. The increase in risk aversion culminates 
ultimately to the critical profit level, &. An increase in the required profit level leads to a reduction of 
enterprises in the market and thus also to a reduction in total output. If risk aversion is increased, it 
means that fewer individuals are prepared to take risks in the market place and there is lack of Knightian 
entrepreneurs (Carree and Thurik 2002)2. 
The rest of the section is organized as follows. First a seminal theory of economic growth is presented 
shortly: the neoclassical growth theory by Solow3. The endogenous growth theory concludes the 
chapter.  
 2.3 Neoclassical theory of economic growth 
Acs et al. (2003) define the neoclassical growth model by Solow as follows. In the Solow model, an 
aggregate production function (Cobb-Douglas production function) is assumed to exhibit the basic 
properties such as constant returns to scale and substitutability among factors of production. The 
                                                          
2
 The assumptions about risk aversion in markets ultimately lead discussion to the choice between employment 
and entrepreneurship.  
3
 Sometimes referred to as Solow-Swan growth theory. The original paper by Solow (1956) is called “A Contribution 
to the Theory of Economic Growth” and by Swan (1956) “Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation”. Both can be 
found also from references. 
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factors of production in the basic model are (unskilled) labor (L) and capital (K). K and L are assumed to 
exhibit decreasing returns to scale. 
 
'  ()L)   0<)<1 
 
Savings are channeled into increasing the capital base in an economy: as long as capital growth rate is 
higher than capital depreciation rate capital accumulates. However, the marginal productivity of capital 
decreases the more there is capital in an economy. Also, if the capital accumulation rate is higher than 
the population growth rate, capital intensity increases (K/L). Capital accumulation (per person) can be 
presented with the following equation: 
 
+,  = skα − (n + -)k 
 
s is the savings rate, n depicts population growth rate and - is the depreciation rate of capital.  
When investments reach the level that just covers depreciation and the amount of capital that that is 
needed to fulfill the capital need of the increased labor supply, capital per person is constant (K/L). 
Solow proposed that an economy adjusts into a long-term equilibrium (steady state), where aggregate 
production and capital accumulation grow at a rate determined by the growth rate of population.  
 
At the steady state the following equation holds:  
y* =  ./01
2
234 
From this it follows that in the steady state, an increase in the savings rate s increases the steady state 
income per capita, since 
56&
5. >0. Thus in the short-run, economic growth can be only enhanced by 
encouraging savings. However, the impact ceases in the long-run since the marginal productivity of 
capital decreases and the economy adjusts back to its steady state growth rate.  
The model also predicts that increases in the capital depreciation rate and in the population growth rate 
decrease the per capita income since 
56&
5/  <0 and 
56&
51  <0. At the aggregate level, similar results can be 
drawn: increases in the savings rate increase steady state aggregate income and increases in the capital 
deprecation rate will decrease the aggregate income. As proposed above, at the aggregate level, 
increases in the population growth rate will increase the aggregate income.  
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Already Solow himself noted that the model did not account for the historical growth and he continued 
to develop it. Solow added another variable in the equation. He introduced technological progress which 
became to known as Solow’s technical residual.  
The model now assumes that output is a function of capital and effective labor (AL). By enhancing the 
production technology, more output can be achieved with a given level of the other production factors 
(K, L).  
The production function can be written as: 
'  7(, 8   ()9:8)  
A(t) is an exogenous variable. In the Solow model, technology is assumed to be public good freely 
available to everyone. The assumption leads to the following result: every firm may use the newest 
technology without affecting the possibility for all the other firms to utilize that knowledge also. 
Technology is assumed to grow at the following constant growth rate.  
;,
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 < depicts the technological growth rate. The difference between the modified Solow model and the 
basic Solow model is that, in the modified Solow model aggregate production grows with the same rate 
as productive labor compared to the pure growth rate of population in the basic model. Thus, in the 
modified Solow model economy grows at the same rate as technology < (Kilponen and Santavirta 2002).  
A point to be mentioned is that the Solow model does not include entrepreneur as it could be 
misinterpreted by the notion of knowledge. Karlsson et al. (2004) argue that knowledge and effective 
labor are incompletely defined in the model, and thus they can be related to various factors that then 
contribute to economic growth. 
Despite the progress made in modeling neoclassical growth theories, most part of the witnessed 
economic growth was still determined exogenously and not captured by models. Also, the mechanisms 
that create technological progress and knowledge accumulation remained unspecified. The most 
promising models, according to Acs et al. (2003), where presented by Arrow (1962) and Sheshinski 
(1967). They suggested that learning-by-doing is an important by-product of production that ultimately 
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diffuses into whole economy. Nevertheless, Acs et al. (2003) argue that even these models were not 
completely integrated into growth context. However, knowledge as a means of economic growth was 
presented and it started to gain success as the explanatory variable instead of growth in population and 
in the traditional exogenously modeled technological variable.  
The traditional growth drivers, capital, population and technical progress, can be the sources of 
economic growth even today in the developing nations where much of the population is unemployed, 
scale economies are not exploited in their full potential and such countries are just catching the 
developed nations in technological progress. The situation is not the same for developed countries, and 
thus alternatives for the traditional growth drivers have to be presented. As Karlsson et al. (2004) noted, 
in his research Steele (2000) raised criticism against the traditional theoretical approaches to economic 
growth. He questioned the underlying neoclassical assumptions of a social equilibrium and individual 
optimization and instead argued, that economic growth is related to market disequilibria with 
entrepreneurship functioning as an equilibrating process. Thus knowledge that entrepreneurs utilize in 
their process of pursuing opportunities and establishing new enterprises is seen as the growth driver 
today and the models that try to capture growth have to explain growth with the utilization of 
knowledge.  
Technological progress and new knowledge are in some extent related to each other: new knowledge 
obviously can create enhancements in technology and even whole new technologies, which then affect 
national growth. In the traditional growth theories, technological progress was seen as the growth driver 
but today the ultimate source of growth is new knowledge. Thus, just the source of economic growth 
has changed to new knowledge, technology as a growth mechanism still exists. Technology is still a 
vehicle but new knowledge is the source.  
2.4  The theory of endogenous growth 
Since the last decade of the 20th century, small and particularly new businesses have been the force 
driving entrepreneurship. In addition, recent econometric evidence suggests that entrepreneurship is a 
vital determinant of economic growth (Audretsch and Fritsch, 2002; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004; 
Karlsson et al. 2004; Thurik 2007; Thurik, Carree, van Stel and Audretsch 2008). According to Thurik 
(2007) and Audretsch, Carree, van Stel and Thurik (2002) a vice versa situation exists: the lack of 
entrepreneurship leads to reduced economic growth (as seen from the example in section 2.2.4). 
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Moreover, Carree and Thurik (2003) argue that the positive link between entrepreneurship and 
economic growth has been verified across all observation units, which include the establishment, the 
enterprise, the industry, the region and the country. Wong et al. (2005) among others suggest further 
that precisely fast growing new enterprises account for most of the new job creation, not new 
enterprises in general. 
Acs et al. (2003) present empirical support for the link between new enterprises and economic growth. 
According to the researchers, a series of recent studies have confirmed a statistical regularity between 
various measures of entrepreneurial activity, most typically startup rates, and economic growth. In 
another study by Acs (2002), he examines the relationship between startup rates and economic growth 
for 348 United States regions in the 1990s. He found plausible evidence that confirms the positive 
relations between startup rates and regional growth rates. The statistical relationship between 
entrepreneurship and growth was stronger than the relationship between economic growth and any 
other regional characteristic, such as human capital, income levels and population growth. Similar 
results have been confirmed in numerous studies, including Acs (2003), Dejardin (2000) and Reynolds 
(1999), among others. 
 
Empirical evidence is found also in other countries. Fölster (2000) examines not just the employment 
impact within new and small firms but the overall link between increases in self-employment and total 
employment in Sweden during 1976–1995. Hart and Hanvey (1995) link measures of new and small 
firms to employment generation in the late 1980s England. They found that employment creation came 
largely from small and medium sized enterprises. Callejon and Segarra (1999) studied the link in Spain 
and also confirmed the findings of other researchers. A study made of 23 OECD (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) countries provides empirical evidence from a 1984–1994 
cross-sectional study. According to the research, increased entrepreneurship, as measured by business 
ownership rates, is associated with higher rates of employment growth at the country level. Similarly, 
Audretsch et al. (2002) and Carree and Thurik (1999) found that such OECD countries that exhibited 
higher increases in entrepreneurship also experienced greater rates of growth and lower levels of 
unemployment.  
 
Romer (1986, 1980) and Lucas (1988) made seminal contributions to the endogenous growth theory. 
According to Acs et al. (2003), the economists endogenized knowledge production within economies. As 
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a consequence, economic growth was begun to seen as the result of the purposeful creation of 
knowledge. 
In Romer (1986), firms’ investments in research and development (R&D) create factor accumulation. The 
decision to invest in knowledge production is based on temporary monopolistic market power, expected 
gains and market cost of additional R&D as well as on imperfect copyright and patent laws that cause 
knowledge spillovers. According to the endogenous growth theory, there are diminishing returns to 
investments in R&D. The diminishing returns are compensated by the spillovers of knowledge, since the 
spillovers increase the whole knowledge base at the economy level (Fingleton 2002). 
In addition to above, Romer (1986) assumed that the stock of R&D workers is the main determinant of 
the rate at which knowledge grows. The Romerian framework of technological progress thus 
concentrates on the accumulation of knowledge stock. The traditional assumptions then just propose 
that economic growth pours forth from new technological innovations the R&D workers create. There is 
totally missing the relation of new knowledge and economic growth. As will be discussed later on in the 
chapter, the mechanism that relates new knowledge and economic growth to each other, that is 
knowledge filter and spillovers as well entrepreneurs seeking for windows of opportunities, are missing 
from the picture.  The deficiency is corrected by altering the basic endogenous growth theory by 
introducing entrepreneurship in the model. 
 
Lucas (1988) assumed that each R&D worker has a unique set of knowledge in a particular technology 
area. The consequences of the assumption Lucas (1988) made are extremely acceptable. It stresses that 
learning and understanding knowledge is very expensive and that each knowledge worker has a limited 
capacity to learn, use and understand knowledge. These kinds of arguments are easy to relate from 
theory to the real world. 
 2.4.1. The basic structure of the endogenous growth model 
Endogenous growth model has its grounds in the above discussed neoclassical growth model (especially 
the AK-models are proposed as the basis for the endogenous growth theory). Some of the basic 
assumptions are thus valid also in the endogenous growth model.  
According to Acs et al. (2003), the basic structure of the model proposes that knowledge is produced in 
profit-maximizing firms as any other good. Thus the production of knowledge is assumed to be 
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endogenous. Endogenous knowledge production affects growth by two main mechanisms. First, 
knowledge aids companies run their businesses more efficiently. Second, since knowledge spills over 
across firms also other economic agents, for example new entrepreneurs, can take advantage of the 
spilled over new knowledge. This shifts the production function of every firm in the economy upwards 
resulting in more production with the same amounts of other production factors (capital and labor). 
Both of the effects increase firm level productivity. 
In the following I briefly present the micro foundation and assumptions of the endogenous growth 
theory proposed by Acs et al. (2003). According to the researchers, the unmodified model does not 
depict reality, as will be seen from the argumentation below, and some modifications on the 
assumptions have to be made. Thus the below presentation is already a slightly modified version of the 
basic endogenous growth theory. I will not present the characteristics of the unmodified endogenous 
growth theory, some of them are discussed right above (in the section that describes the neoclassical 
theory) and also below together with the presentation of the modifications. As will be argued, even the 
modified version of the endogenous growth theory is insufficient to explain economic growth and the 
presentation will slowly be directed to the endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship which better 
captures economic growth drivers. 
According to Acs et al. (2003), the knowledge-based growth models have three cornerstones: spatially 
constrained externalities, increasing returns in the production of goods and deceasing returns in the 
production of knowledge. The cornerstones rely on assumptions related to technology, firm 
characteristics, the spatial dimension and knowledge. 
The assumptions on technology 
The production of knowledge exhibits diminishing returns to scale. Hence, doubling the inputs to 
research will not double the amount of knowledge produced. The assumption on diminishing returns to 
technology suggests that an optimum growth rate of technology exists. According to Acs et al. (2003), 
the result is an upper bound of knowledge that is the highest amount of knowledge that can be 
attained.  
The produced knowledge can be used in the production of goods. The production of goods is 
characterized by increasing returns to scale associated with increasing marginal productivity of 
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knowledge, holding all other inputs constant. The growth rates of goods production can increase 
monotonically over time but the increase in the rate of growth is constrained by the decreasing returns 
to scale in knowledge production. The outcome is a well-specified competitive equilibrium model (Acs et 
al. 2003). 
In a two-period model, the first period’s consumption is the difference between exogenously given 
endowment of consumption goods e1 and goods that are used to produce the firm specific k1i. Thus 
consumption and the endowment of consumption goods define the production of knowledge: 
c1i = e1 - k1i 
The firm specific knowledge, ki is just assumed to exist but it is not explicitly modeled.  
 
In the second period, the knowledge ki produced in the first period is used as an input in the production 
of consumption goods. The production function F is assumed to be twice differentiable. In addition to 
knowledge ki, it includes a fixed vector x that represents all other factors of production used by the firm.  
Firms benefit also from knowledge spillovers that all the other firms (n) are generating K  C k
/
EF , 
since each individual firm cannot appropriate all the produced knowledge themselves. The production 
function is 
 
F(k1,x,K)  F1≥0, F12≤0, F2≥0, F22≤0, F3≥0, F32≥0 
 
The production function has the following properties: it is concave and homogeneous of degree one as a 
function of ki and x holding K constant but convex in all arguments. Thus knowledge and all the other 
factors of production, namely x, exhibit constant returns to scale and the production of knowledge 
exhibits diminishing returns to scale. The point that makes the production functions useful in the 
context is that it exhibits increasing returns to scale in all arguments. Thus the production function is 
assumed to exhibit globally increasing marginal productivity of knowledge (K). The important implication 
is that the aggregate production function for the whole economy is characterized by increasing returns 
to k1. 
 
The assumptions on companies 
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A common assumption of general equilibrium models is that each unit of labor is identical for a firm. In 
endogenous growth models the scale and number of firms are undefined. Firms are assumed to take 
prices as given which implicitly mean that there are many firms operating in competitive markets and 
earning zero profits.  
 
The number of firms, entry rates and the scale of operations cannot be determined but the following 
assumptions are typically imposed: the number of firms is given, no entry occurs and all firms operate at 
the same level. The assumptions suggest that the number of firms correspond to the number of 
individuals and that labor growth rate is at the same level as the rate at which individuals vanish from 
the markets; total labor is constant (Acs et al. 2003). 
Audretsch et al. (2003) give a more thorough presentation of the production function (which has the 
above mentioned characteristics). The below presentation also depicts the similarities between the 
traditional endogenous growth theory and the Solow model. The production function is: 
 
Y = ()(A86), 
 
where Y represents total output, K stock of capital, Ly is the labor force dedicated in the production of Y 
and A is the stock of knowledge capital. The production function is the traditional Cobb-Douglas 
production function. The capital accumulation function has the usual characteristics Solow (1956) 
presented: 
 
K = GEY-δK, 
 
where sk is the saving rate and δ the rate of capital depreciation, δK being the total amount of capital 
that depreciates at certain unit of time.  
 
Assumptions on knowledge 
 
As mentioned above, all firms take advantage of the firm-specific knowledge ki in the production of 
goods. The produced knowledge is assumed to be in firms forever. Thus Acs et al. (2003) argue that the 
produced knowledge does not depreciate and if no research is conducted, ki is constant.  
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A question that may arise from the claim that firms are symmetric is that why firm-specific knowledge is 
needed. In addition, as also assumed in the Solow models, if the produced knowledge spills over in its 
entirety and all the other enterprises in an economy can freely benefit from it, why do entrepreneurs 
decide to invest in knowledge production? In the Solow models, the question is not solved. On the other 
hand, in the endogenous models firms are assumed to produce goods differently. In addition, it is 
necessary to assume that the knowledge firms produce is at some parts firm-specific. If the produced 
knowledge is entirely identical, spillovers would be direct and comprehensive, as proposed above. 
Hence, there would be no incentive to invest in knowledge and subsequently no, or at least less growth. 
Still, Acs et al. (2003) argue that the explanations are not consistent with microeconomic setup. 
 
According to Acs et al. (2003), the aggregated stock of knowledge that generates spillovers to other 
firms is characterized as an undefined public good.  It is available in books among other public sources 
and every institution and person can access the public part of the privately produced knowledge. The 
other part of the produced knowledge is firm-specific. It shifts the production function upwards given all 
the other production factors. The firms-specific knowledge affects all firms similarly. 
 
The above classification of knowledge can be easily approved in comparison with the real world. The 
perfectly accessible part of produced knowledge can be for example acquired from scientific 
publications, patent applications and other suchlike public sources. The other part of the produced 
knowledge is novel and tacit, bound to firms and individuals. Tacit knowledge is sometimes called in the 
academic literature as silent knowledge.  
 
Assumptions of the spatial dimension 
 
According to Acs et al. (2003), a principal assumption of the basic theory of endogenous growth is that 
the total stock of knowledge (K) is evenly distributed across space. However, as the researchers claim, 
the assumption does not hold in the literature on geographic knowledge spillovers. The reason is that 
the most valuable type of knowledge, new technological knowledge, is tacit. Tacitness makes the access 
to new knowledge geographically bounded: in order to access the new knowledge, one has to be 
geographically near the place where innovation actually happens.  
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To sum up, although the endogenous growth models are clear advances in the area of measuring and 
modeling growth today, there are still parts of growth that are unexplained. Thus the endogenous 
growth models do not gain much empirical support. Indeed, it is not explained by the model why for 
example such countries that have high R&D expenditures (Sweden and Japan) have lower gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rates than countries with smaller R&D expenditures (Ireland and 
Denmark)4. The deficiency is a consequence from the assumption that knowledge automatically spills 
over and is transformed into commercial activities. The model does not take into account that there has 
to be economic agents that search for opportunities, are able to discover new innovations and has the 
knowhow to transform knowledge into whole new ideas. Thus the fact that technological opportunities 
exist does not automatically mean that the opportunities are discovered, exploited and commercialized.  
 
It seems that there is a “missing link” in the model. The mechanism that translates knowledge into 
actual outcomes is not explained by the either the basic or the slightly modified endogenous growth 
model. According to Acs et al. (2003), innovative entry, reorganization and rationalization of existing 
firms and firm exits need to be integrated into the endogenous growth process in order to reach the 
interdependency between knowledge, opportunity and commercialization. Knowledge spillover theory 
of entrepreneurship is closely related to the endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship and for 
that reason it is presented before the actual modified endogenous growth theory. 
 2.4.2 The knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship 
The traditional approach to entrepreneurship compares different attributes of individuals. Differences in 
risk aversion, person’s preference to autonomy and self-direction as well as differences in access to 
scarce resources, such as human, social and financial capital, determine whether an individual will 
become an entrepreneur. In brief, the traditional theory of entrepreneurship takes the context as given 
and changes the individual characteristics in order to determine an entrepreneur (Audretsch et al. 
2006).  
The knowledge spillover theory takes a different stand. According to Audretsch et al. (2006), the 
knowledge spillover theory holds the individual characteristics constant and by placing the individual 
into different contexts analyzes how the cognitive process of making the decision to become an 
entrepreneur is influenced. In particular, the theory compares high knowledge contexts with 
                                                          
4
 For more information, Acs et al. (2006) present informative studies conducted in OECD countries. 
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impoverished knowledge contexts. The new approach alters the conception of entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurship is not a phenomenon exogenously determined by personal attributes and family 
history but an endogenous response to opportunities that are generated by investments in new 
knowledge (Audretsch et al. 2006). 
According to Audretsch et al. (2006), the endogenous response to the incomplete commercialization of 
new knowledge provides the missing link in recent economic growth models. Without entrepreneurship 
much of new knowledge would be wasted. Thus as a consequence, entrepreneurship is a mechanism 
that improves a society’s ability to more completely utilize the investments made in new knowledge.  
Empirical evidence to support the knowledge spillover theory is provided by Audretsch et al. (2006). The 
researchers analyzed variations in startup rates across different industries that reflected different 
knowledge contexts. Empirical analysis clearly showed the connection between high startup rates and a 
high level of investment in new knowledge. According to the researchers, the result is assumed to 
support the knowledge spillover theory.  
The knowledge spillover theory presents the term knowledge filter (Audretsch et al. 2006). The 
characteristics of new knowledge combined with wide spectrum of institutions, rules and regulations 
impose the filter. According to Audretsch et al. (2006), knowledge filter creates the opportunity for 
entrepreneurship. The less permeable the filter the more it creates opportunities since the greater is the 
difference in valuation of new knowledge by decision-making hierarchies of incumbent firms and other 
economic agents.  
The knowledge spillover theory shifts the attention away from firms to individuals, such as scientists, 
engineers and other knowledge workers – agents with endowments of new economic knowledge 
(Audretsch et al. 2006).  
The fundamental question is that how can an economic agent with a given endowment of new 
knowledge best appropriate the returns from that knowledge? According to Audretsch et al. (2006), if a 
scientist or engineer can pursue new ideas in his workplace where the new knowledge is also created, 
and roughly appropriate the expected value of that knowledge, he does not have a reason to leave the 
company. Nevertheless, if he values the idea more than the incumbent firm he may choose to establish 
own company to appropriate the true value of the new knowledge he is aware of. Audretsch et al. 
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(2006) argue that the bigger the difference between the valuation of the new knowledge by the 
incumbent firm and the innovator, the more probable is the establishment of a new firm. However, it is 
expensive to start an own company. In order for the new knowledge to create new enterprises, the 
valuation difference has to at least cover the expense of starting an enterprise. 
Audretsch et al. (2006) noted that the knowledge spillover theory assumes the knowledge production 
function to be inverted. The knowledge is exogenous and embodied in a worker, whereas in the 
traditional theory of entrepreneurship individual characteristics are exogenously given. Audretsch et al. 
(2006) argue that the knowledge spillover theory is actually a theory of endogenous entrepreneurship, 
where entrepreneurship is an endogenous response to opportunities created by investments in new 
knowledge that are not commercialized because of the knowledge filter. 
 2.4.3 The knowledge filter, entrepreneurship and endogenous growth  
 
In this section I concentrate on the modification made to the endogenous growth theory. By changing 
some assumptions the model takes into account entrepreneurs. The emphasis of the original 
endogenous growth models is to explain why knowledge impacts growth, not how. Thus, less attention 
is paid to the diffusion or transmission of knowledge, to the mechanism that makes knowledge 
accessible. Also, there is not enough discussion about the absorptive capacity on the part that receives 
the new knowledge. Still, these are obviously critical issues in modeling knowledge-based growth.  
 2.4.3.1 The missing link 
New knowledge leads to opportunities. Economic agents such as workers, entrepreneurs and whole 
incumbent organizations exploit the opportunities commercially. According to Acs et al. (2003), the 
opportunities new knowledge creates can be expressed as a function of the distribution of knowledge 
within and between societies. They also claim that the opportunities are not in neat packages ready to 
be exploited but rather they have to be discovered and packaged. Precisely for that reason the 
connection between opportunities and entrepreneurs is essential for the model since without that 
connection opportunities would be left unused.  
 
Acs et al. (2003) noted that knowledge by itself may be a necessary condition for new enterprises to 
emerge in a growth theory. In order to transform new knowledge into economic knowledge and 
opportunities requires skills, aptitudes, insights and circumstances that are not uniformly or widely 
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distributed in the population. Moreover, Acs et al. (2003) argue that empirical findings seem to suggest 
that the entry of entrepreneurs is an important link between the creation of knowledge and the 
commercialization of that knowledge, particularly in the early stages when knowledge is still fluid.  
 
The argument that entrepreneurs are needed for new knowledge to be transferred into economically 
relevant knowledge implies that there is a filter between new knowledge and new economically relevant 
knowledge. So, not only K varies across countries (K can vary across countries since different countries 
expend different amounts of capital in R&D) but also the transmission capacity varies. In other words, in 
different countries there are varying amounts of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial activities. In 
sum, the more there are entrepreneurs in an economy, the more there is absorptive capacity and also, 
the more knowledge transforms into economically relevant knowledge: a larger share of new ideas 
flows through the knowledge filter.  
 2.4.3.2 The theory of endogenous growth of entrepreneurship 
As argued previously, the basic shortcoming of the endogenous growth model is that it fails to recognize 
that only some part of the produced knowledge (K) is economically useful. Also even economically 
relevant knowledge (Kc) is not necessarily exploited successfully if transmission links do not exist.  
As stated above, the amount of entrepreneurial activity is affected by the thickness of the filter. Two 
countries with similar degree of knowledge production activities but different filter capacities face 
unequal amounts of idea flows through the filters. An obvious finding is that the amount of 
entrepreneurs, the capacity of the knowledge filter and the level of investments in new knowledge all 
have influence on economic growth.  
Another point concerning the productive capacity in nations relate to the fact that economic agents are 
not evenly distributed across countries. Even if the stock of knowledge is freely available, including both 
tacit and non-tacit knowledge, individuals’ ability to transform knowledge into economic knowledge is 
not the same for all individuals: the important individual characteristics are not spread evenly across and 
within countries.  
When the knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship is introduced alongside with the endogenous 
growth model, Audretsch et al. (2006) as well as Acs et al. (2003) argue that the knowledge spillover 
theory of entrepreneurship challenges two fundamental assumptions that implicitly drive the results in 
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the endogenous growth model. The first is that knowledge is automatically equated with economic 
knowledge and the second that knowledge is automatically and in its entirety spilled over.  
In order to wield the limitations of the above presented endogenous growth model and to specify the 
nature of the transmission link, some assumptions need to be changed. The below presentation follows 
Acs et al. (2003). 
The assumptions 
 1.  New firms are assumed to be the only mechanism that transmits knowledge (K) into  
  economically relevant knowledge (Kc). K transforms into Kc by spillovers. Kc is   
  exploited in new enterprises, whether the knowledge is new, already existing,   
  scientific knowledge or other kind of knowledge. Learning takes always the form of new  
  enterprise. The conclusion of the assumption is that if there are no startups, whether  
  as genuinely new entities or as new entities within existing firms, there are no spillovers  
  and hence no growth.  
 2. Every firm presents new innovation. The innovation can be created from new or  
  existing knowledge as well as from a combination of the two. As a   
  consequence, firms are heterogeneous. Heterogeneity does not  include only size  
  dimension but all firm characteristics, such as absorptive capacity, strategy, technology, 
  product range and all aspects of performance (profitability, productivity, and so on).  
  New entrants are naturally less experienced than incumbent firms: they often make  
  mistakes, fail and exit. Thus in the new set of assumptions, the turbulence and dynamics 
  entrepreneurs create is taken into account. Also following the preceding argument, a  
  high entry rate is necessary to sustain long-term growth.  
 3. There are no interregional spillovers, only local. All firms in the specific location are  
  assumed to have equal access to the stock of knowledge. Nevertheless, the success of  
  converting general knowledge into economically useful firm-specific knowledge   
  depends on the absorptive capacity that each firm possesses and hence on firm   
  characteristics. Also both private and public knowledge is subject to spillovers. 
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 The assumption alters the view of knowledge compared to the basic endogenous growth theory: 
knowledge is not anymore divided into undefined public good and firm-specific knowledge. The model’s 
fine character is that it turns the attention to entrepreneurs and to their abilities to utilize from the 
common good. Thus it actually compares individuals to each other and their competences to unite the 
right kind of people to perform the right kinds of tasks. 
 4.  Policy and previous history (path dependence) determines the entrepreneurial   
  “climate” in the form of infrastructure, regulation, attitudes, networks and technology  
  transfer mechanisms among others. Thus the conditions for new entry and knowledge  
  transmission vary across regions. 
A simple theoretical framework 
 The endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship includes above assumptions as well the knowledge 
filter. The filter that determines the rate at which the stock of knowledge (K) is converted into 
economically useful firm-specific knowledge (Kc) has the following characteristic (Acs et al. 2003, 
Audretsch et al. 2006): 
0≤K
c
/K≤1 
According to Acs et al. (2003), there are two conditions that need to be fulfilled for the increasing stock 
of knowledge to create higher economic growth. Both of the conditions have been presented also by 
Audretsch et al. (2006) and thus discussed already above. For the first, knowledge has to be 
economically useful and for the second, there must be entrepreneurs in an economy. If the two 
conditions are not fulfilled, an increase in stock of knowledge may have no impact on economic growth. 
Another obvious conclusion is that an economy with smaller knowledge stock may grow at a faster rate 
because the economy is more endowed with entrepreneurs. This conclusion supports the empirical 
evidence that some high R&D countries experience slower economic growth compared to countries with 
lower investments in R&D.  
The model Asc et al. (2003) suggests comprises two firms: the incumbent firm and the new enterprise. 
The incumbent firm (I) has accumulated knowledge throughout its lifetime. The firm specific knowledge 
can be modeled as follows: 
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As earlier, ki depicts the firm-specific knowledge and K depicts the whole knowledge base in a specific 
region. At each given point in time, firm-specific knowledge of the incumbent firms i in industry j depend 
on their previous investment in knowledge and the size of K at time t. The already accumulated firm-
specific knowledge within incumbent firms has two consequences for the firms’ ability to utilize new 
knowledge spillovers from K. First, the size of accumulated firm specific knowledge defines firms’ 
capacity to absorb new knowledge and second, the degree of firm specificity constrains the absorption 
of knowledge spillovers. As a conclusion, the consequences are competing. 
The second type of firm is the startup company, the new entrepreneur. Startup companies do not have 
history, and thus they have not accumulated knowledge earlier. New entrepreneurs exploit 
opportunities arising from aggregate spillovers and the entrepreneur’s ability to transform the new 
knowledge into commercial opportunity is in crucial position. 
( ,AL  = f(K),  ∑ +./ = (. 
K
s 
in period 1 becomes part of K
I
 in the subsequent period. The relation between Ks in the previous 
period and Kl in the current period reflects the presence of entrepreneurship in an economy. 
Both types of firms utilize the knowledge spillovers although in different ways. Thus they narrow the gap 
between total spillovers and the share of those knowledge spillovers that are commercialized. According 
to Acs et al. (2003), the complete mapping between Kc and K is unrealistic (the complete mapping would 
require implying perfect information in an unbounded state space). Thus they present following 
relationships: 
K
c
 =K
cI
 + K
cs
, where        
K
cI
 = θK     and      K
cs
 = λK ,               0≤θ and λ<1 
 K ≥ K
c
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Kc = (θ+λ)K 
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θ can be thought as the absorptive capacity of incumbent firms and λ as a proxy for entrepreneurship 
within an economy. 
In accordance with the assumptions 1 and 2, the production function presented earlier need to be 
modified to include also entrepreneurship (λ).  
F(ki, x, λK) 
Since the entrepreneurial sector is characterized by high entry and exit rates, not only do new firms 
constantly enter the market but also firms fail and exit as proposed by the endogenous growth theory 
and proved by empirical evidence. Thus, the term λ should be seen as net entrepreneurship so that it 
includes also the dynamics in the entrepreneurial sector. 
Audretsch et al. (2006) present the modified production function as follows: 
'  ()MN9O8P
O
  
 In the production function MNdenotes the realized permeability of the knowledge filter, that is the level 
of knowledge that is utilized by the startup enterprises (1-θ).  θr has the following property: θ≤θr≤1. 
According to the theory, an increase in the entrepreneurial activity increases also the amount of new 
knowledge utilized by entrepreneurs. As the endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship proposes, 
economies grow as a result of entrepreneurial activities. The following proves the claim.  
By deriving the production function with respect to θr it can be noticed that economic output, Y, 
increases with entrepreneurship: 
5P
5QR
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'  
The result is greater than 0 for all Y and thus Y increases with entrepreneurship. 
The R&D – sector is modeled by Audretsch et al. (2006) as follows: 
 
A = бULA, 
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where бU is the discovery rate of new innovations: 
 
бU = б8;V9W. 
LA denotes the amount of labor devoted in generating new knowledge, λ (diminishing) returns to scale in 
the R&D – sector and X is a parameter that expresses the intensity of knowledge spillovers (note that λ 
in Acs et al. 2003 denote entrepreneurship; thus to avoid confusions I use the notion ρ from now on to 
denote the returns to scale in the R&D - sector). By inserting the discovery rate of new innovations –
equation into the model of R&D –sector, the rate that new knowledge (the rate of endogenous technical 
change) is created can be obtained 
 
 A = б8;
Y9W. 
 
Obviously the stock of labor devoted to R&D-sector as well as the amount of knowledge already existing 
in the region affects the amounts of knowledge produced. In other words, a worker today is more 
productive than his counterpart previously because there is more knowledge for the today’s worker to 
take advantage of.  
By combining the knowledge accumulation with the assumptions made above, the actual level of new 
knowledge produced by incumbent firms can be presented as 
Ac = θб8;
Y9W. 
The knowledge production function exhibits similar properties as the knowledge production function 
presented above. The remaining part, 1 – θ, is the opportunity that can be taken on by new firms. It can 
be denoted as entrepreneurial opportunities. Thus, 
Aopp = (1 – θ)A = (1 – θ) б8;
Y9W. 
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In conclusion, Audretsch et al. (2006) prove empirically such hypothesis correct that connects 
knowledge filter, spillovers and commercialization of knowledge to economic growth5.  
Depending to the modified assumptions, the endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship depicts 
the growth drivers today in quite an acceptable manner. The essential assumptions; entrepreneurship, 
new knowledge and firm entry as well the knowledge filter, can all be seen as plausible reflections of 
reality. One of the finest aspects of the theory is that it does not only try to explain growth with 
microenterprises and new firms but rather it takes into account in the growth process both the 
incumbent companies and the new startup and seed stage enterprises. Also current empirical research 
on economic growth emphasizes that growth comes from the existing enterprises as well from new 
emerging companies. Empirical support confirms the relevance of the model as a measurement tool and 
as an illustrator of real economic condition today.  
However, there are also some deficiencies in the model which emerge due to the assumption that new 
enterprises (that is microenterprises) are growth factors. The endogenous growth theory of 
entrepreneurship does not take into account the decision process of becoming an entrepreneur. It is a 
revolutionary decision that a current employee has to make when deciding whether to stay employed or 
not. There are many factors that affect the result of that decision which relate to politics, social and 
cultural environment as well the overall attitude towards entrepreneurship.  
The financial difficulties that the new enterprises face have undoubtedly impact on the economical 
performance both at the firm and the whole economy level. In the models depicting new enterprises 
such variable that measures the availability of financing could be very advantageous for the explanatory 
strength of the model. Thus, new variable could be added in the model: “ƒ” that measures the impact 
financing has on the rate at which new enterprises are born, on the survival of such enterprises and on 
the growth attributes they have. The next chapter clearly presents the difficulties microenterprises have 
with receiving capital from outside the organization. Also in the literature, it is proposed in many 
occasions that the lack of financing restrains the microenterprises from growing. On the other hand, the 
contribution business angels have on the firm growth rates is substantial. In the below presentation 
                                                          
5
 Economic growth hypothesis: Given a level of knowledge investment and severity of the knowledge filter, higher 
levels of economic growth should result from greater entrepreneurial activity, since entrepreneurship serves as a 
mechanism facilitating the spillover and commercialization of knowledge. 
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support is provided for the argument that financial environment should be taken into account in the 
growth model. 
Microenterprises are seeking investment capital that they need in order to exploit new knowledge and 
innovations discussed in the current chapter. Without capital entrepreneurs are unable to exploit and 
commercialize new knowledge which implies that in worst case the entrepreneurial venture does not 
even get to the startup stage. As a conclusion, a good opportunity to utilize new knowledge by 
establishing new venture is wasted. Also, the effect that the new enterprise would one day have on 
employment and economic growth is also thrown away. 
The objective of the next chapter is to present that the venture capital market is inefficient. The main 
result of the chapter is that more financing should be directed to microenterprises and in order to 
achieve it, there has to be something done in the business angel capital sector. 
3. Venture capital and the venture capital market participants 
3.1 Venture capital 
 3.1.1 The definition of venture capital 
Venture capital is briefly and up to the point phrased by the Finnish Venture Capital Association (FVCA). 
Venture capital (VC) implies professional investing in such companies that have potential to increase the 
value of investments fast. Venture financing differs from other forms of investing by its exit purposes: 
although investments are made in equity capital, the investor is not an owner of the company and thus 
he is willing to exit as planned. Other aspect that differentiates venture investments from other forms of 
investing is that the investor participates in the management and control of the company; the investor 
brings also his human capital into the firm (FVCA 2002).  
According to FVCA (2002), Lumme et al. (1998), and Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000), venture 
capital is divided into formal and informal capital. Formal venture capital is provided in formal, or 
institutional, venture capital markets which comprise professional investors. The group includes venture 
capital funds, venture capital companies and institutions. Good examples of venture capitalists from 
Finland are Tekes, Sitra, Foundation for Finnish Inventions (Keksintösäätiö in Finnish) and Veraventure. 
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Luukkonen (2008) further divides the formal venture capital sector into two: public and private formal 
venture capital. 
The informal venture capital is provided by business angels and according to some studies, by family 
members and friends. The nature of the investments made by family members and friends are usually 
extremely different from business angel investments6. Thus academics usually do not include them into 
the analysis concerning informal investments. I will also exclude them from my analysis and they are 
rather just mentioned in order for the definition to be precise.   
Business angels invest their own money in contrast to formal venture capital institutions that invest 
capital not their own. The formal venture institutions serve as intermediaries between the providers of 
capital and the firms acquiring it while business angels invest directly to companies without any go-
betweens. 
The formal venture capital investors raise capital mainly from public sources such as banks, pension 
funds and insurance companies, non-financial companies, wealthy families and charitable trusts (FVCA; 
Mason and Harrison 2008). As discussed in detail in section 3.3, business angels are wealthy individuals 
that have piled capital throughout their professional careers and in some cases inherited a great amount 
of wealth.  
Informal venture investments are usually made with equity capital. Business angels invest capital in 
exchange for shares7. In contrast, the formal venture investments take typically the following forms: 
contributions, subordinated loans, convertible bonds and mezzanine instruments which combine the 
characteristics of both equity and liability capital (FVCA 2002). Also other forms of formal venture capital 
are possible. An example of a clearly increasing trend in formal venture investments area is the 
investment process the Foundation for Finnish Inventions follows. The Foundation for Finnish Inventions 
grants capital to support product development, commercialization and patenting of an invention that 
has been developed in co-ordination with the foundation. The refund is normally conditional: if the 
                                                          
6
 A thorough presentation of informal venture capital including both business angels and friends and family 
members is given by Riding (2008).  
7
 Business angel is not an owner in its traditional definition: although he receives an equity stake of the firm he 
invests in, literature does not define angel investor as an owner of the company (FVCA). The angel investor will exit 
the firm as planned and the equity stake could be seen only as a compensation method. 
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invention is commercially successful capital has to be paid back8. According to for example European 
Commission (2008), this type of formal venture capital is increasing in volume in the Euro zone.  
In addition to investing capital, informal and in some cases formal venture investors provide human 
capital. By participating in the management, control and development of the business, venture investors 
attempt to increase the value of the company. The value added venture investors bring culminate 
mainly to board seats, helping in developing management, strategies and finance, business sector 
knowhow and internationalization of the firm, and M&A activities. In addition, a firm is viewed as more 
credible by other stakeholders when there is a venture capitalist involved with it. The increased 
credibility improves the chances to receive additional capital from other sources (FVCA 2002). 
In order to end the chapter, a final definition of the differences between formal and informal capital is 
provided. Harrison and Mason (1992), among many others, identify three aspects that distinguish 
informal venture capital from formal venture capital. First, business angels concentrate on providing 
relatively small amounts of capital for firms in the startup and early stages. For the second, angel 
investors are more accommodating to the needs of business owners since they have lower rejection 
rates and longer exit horizons. For the third, angel investors usually invest in their local economies.  
 3.1.2 The different financing options growing microenterprises face 
According to FVCA (2002), informal capital is one of the best financing options for a firm that both has 
high growth potential and also aims for high growth path. Young seed stage and startup companies are 
often included into the definition. A growing company has to make investments which require capital. 
Microenterprises do not usually reach high turnover and net income levels and thus the financial inflows 
are insufficient. As a young firm, the enterprise couldn’t have either gathered adequate cash buffers. 
This leaves the growing microenterprises extremely dependent on outside financing. 
With informal capital come many advantages over other forms of financing. The flexibility of angel 
investments compared to other sources as well the proper amounts and the business angel’s 
commitment to the investee enterprise are typically considered as a benefit of informal capital (Harrison 
and Mason 1992). Value for business owners is not only created when the amounts of finance 
                                                          
8
 The refund often includes also a provision of the income the invention generates. The Foundation for Finnish 
Inventions demands 3% of the income stream. In the case that the invention is sold to a third-party, the foundation 
requires 30% of the sales price. 
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demanded and supplied meet (which is not the case usually with formal venture capital) but also the 
angel’s participation in the business creates value. Also compared to debt, equity capital investment 
increases the liquidity of a firm. There are neither interest payments nor installments, in other words 
regular and compulsory capital outflows.  
Research indicates that in order to receive angel financing there are some conditions that the investee 
firm should fulfill. According to the Finnish Venture Capital Association (2002), a firm must have 
competitive advantage in products and services it offers compared to other firms in the market. The 
second requirement is that the management team must be committed to develop the business, which 
ultimately means that the attitude towards growth has to be positive. For the third, the entrepreneur 
must be prepared to dilute the ownership for a limited period of time and give a proportion of the 
company in exchange for capital.  
There are also negative consequences related to business angel financing. First is the above mentioned 
dilution of ownership. Also, despite the angel investor and the business owner share the same goal - to 
increase the value of the company and make the business successful – and for that reason informal 
venture financing should be the most profitable and advantageous financing method, informal capital is 
extremely risky and thus expensive for the entrepreneur.  
Formal venture capital is quite a similar financing tool for microenterprises. As presented earlier the 
forms venture capital often takes include contributions and all sorts of debt instruments (proper listing 
in section 3.1.1.). Similarly to informal venture capital, formal venture capital does not always require 
timely cash outflows and in some cases, the venture capitalist provides also his human capital or 
important contacts with other stakeholders. However, formal venture capital is not often an option for 
microenterprises and usually the supplied and demanded amounts tend to mismatch.  
Bank debt is increasingly not an option for the high risk microenterprises. Public debt markets and banks 
in general are prevalent sources of debt capital for large companies (banks for small companies that are 
not that risky) but not for growing microenterprises. There are a couple of fundamental reasons behind 
this. First of all, new growth companies do not usually have real securities that banks require. Due to the 
nature of the business innovative young enterprises exhibit, usually the only assets such firms have are 
human capital and intangible rights. Banks do not accept these assets as collateral. A potential cure for 
the difficult situation is the involvement of a third party that could provide collateral for the loan on 
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behalf of the borrowing firm. For the second, banks are not aware of the prospects of new companies 
and of the entrepreneurs themselves since there is no historical data or track records. Asymmetric 
information is prevailing between the provider and the borrower of capital which ultimately makes the 
market inefficient. For the third, there have been changes in the banking sector which have reduced 
lending for startup and seed stage enterprises. In addition to the three obvious reasons, banks face the 
same deterrent as the formal venture capitalists: the high risk level that is due to the fact that the firm is 
trying to grow.  
 Nevertheless, microenterprises do receive bank debt in some cases. With debt financing, the 
entrepreneur could avoid the ownership dilution. Also, for such entrepreneurs that regard business 
angel involvement with the enterprise reluctantly, bank debt could be a relief since then an angel 
investor is not part of the business. The negative sides of debt include interests and installments. The 
outward cash flow can weaken the financial situation of the young enterprise and cause financial 
distress since the interests and installments have to be paid in time. A growth firm may find it difficult to 
meet the payments since, as discussed above, the turnover and operating profit fluctuate and the cash 
buffers are not yet sufficient. Also, often during heavy growth periods, the income that is left for debt 
liabilities and tax payments decreases. The required installments and interests could at worst case drive 
an enterprise into insolvency.  
Other potential sources of capital include loans from family members and friends. This type of capital is 
insufficient, inefficient and not a financial option that should be reckoned with in the thesis. A proper 
presentation of capital provided by family members and friends can be found in Riding (2008). 
In conclusion, a note should be made. According to studies, companies prefer some forms of capital 
over others in financing investments. The theory based on this observation is called the pecking order 
theory. The pecking order theory suggests that in making investments, firms prefer to use first and most 
income but if it is not achievable, debt financing in the order of harmlessness (Brealey et al. 2008).  
However, due to the obstacles young firms face in the borrowing markets, they are forced to come up 
with different financing solutions compared to the more traditional ones. As a conclusion, the pecking 
order theory does not hold for such companies. Indeed, it is noticed that the pecking order theory is 
reversed for new firms: new enterprises receive hardly any income and banks are reluctant to lend. New 
firms prefer equity over debt in financing investments and the last form of capital in question is income.  
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3.2 The venture capital market 
Traditionally banks have been the most important lending institution for all kinds of companies. The 
importance of banks as lenders has been noticed all around the world and already many decades ago. 
When in need of capital, firms of all sizes and ages have turned to banking institutions for loans and 
other capital instruments. Even nowadays a major number of all researchers, academicians, politicians 
and other powers in societies share the opinion that banks are an unbeatable institution in the lending 
market. Due to the importance of banks, financial needs have been previously fulfilled with the 
traditional forms of debt capital: loans and short-term credits. 
However, today an increasing amount of capital comes from other sources than banks. The financial 
markets have developed in a quick pace which means that there is also public capital available (different 
kinds of bonds and equity among others). Especially the stock markets around the world have developed 
enormously which makes equity capital available for many companies. An obvious trend is that the 
importance of banks as capital providers is decreasing.  
In spite of the pecking order theory, even large companies need to finance some of their investments 
with equity capital in order to keep the financial distress and too high capital costs in discipline. For large 
companies, despite of them been public or private, it is somewhat easy to raise both equity and debt 
capital either from the financial markets or from the current owners. The situation is clearly worse for 
microenterprises. They are increasingly seeking financing from other sources than banks and today, the 
venture capital market is raising its importance among the possible lenders. 
 3.2.1 The venture capital market participants 
According to Finnish Venture Capital Association, there are both domestic and foreign venture capital 
companies as well business angels in the venture capital market in Finland. The venture capital 
companies are different from each other by many aspects. Some of them operate only locally and on the 
other hand, large companies may have their own venture capital units that make investments to firms in 
the same field. Through these so called corporate venturing investments, large companies aim to 
retrieve strategic benefits for the parent company (FVCA).  
In year 2008, the demand side of the Finnish financial market was as follows. 99% of all firms were small 
enterprises employing fewer than 50 persons. The share of medium-size enterprises employing fewer 
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than 250 persons was 0.8% of the total amount of firms, and 0.2% of all firms were large enterprises 
employing more than 250 persons. The share of the smallest enterprises (microenterprises) employing 
less than 10 persons was 95% (Statistics Finland).  
The small enterprises employed 46.4%, medium-size enterprises 16.4% and large enterprises 37.2% of 
all personnel. In contrast the largest share, 51.3%, of the total turnover was generated by the large 
enterprises. The share of small enterprises was 32.6% and that of medium-size 16.1% (Statistics Finland).  
According to Statistics Finland, the number of the very smallest enterprises employing fewer than five 
persons increased by most, by 4.5%, from the previous year. By contrast, personnel and turnover 
increased most in large enterprises. 
By looking at the structure of Finnish enterprise sector, it can be noted that small companies clearly 
dominate. To my opinion, there is obviously potential in micro companies for two reasons: there is an 
enormous amount of microenterprises and the relative growth potential is indescribable. A 
microenterprise with a couple of workers and a great business idea can grow with the right kind of 
people, strategy and actions involved with it. If one enterprise grows from a two-to-five employee 
company to employing from 20 to 30 people, it is surely regarded as a positive matter but nevertheless, 
the impact for the whole economy is extremely small. But, when more than one microenterprise 
experience high growth, the effect on aggregate employment and economy is also relatively speaking 
much larger. The number of extremely small companies that could grow to employ even tens of 
employees is very high and thus also the total effect on employment could be remarkable9. Thus the 
small enterprise sector has a lot of potential to enhance national welfare and growth and the small 
enterprises cannot be overlooked in any way.  
Such a high growth in the number of employees requires evidently that the entrepreneurs want their 
firms to grow. Not all small companies aim to grow but there are surely many such enterprises that 
would like to expand the business, if the growth was only possible. Rainio (2009) studied the attitudes 
towards growth in the Finnish enterprises. Her study clearly indicates that the Finnish entrepreneurs are 
too risk averse and thus, too few entrepreneurs are willing to take on the necessary risks that it takes to 
grow. According to Finnish Venture Capital Association (2002), Paasivirta and Aaltonen (2003) and Rainio 
                                                          
9
 In year 2008 the amount of small enterprises was around 317 700 and of microenterprises 305 000 (statistics 
Finland). 
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(2009), informal investors notice their investment targets on the basis of their growth potential and 
willingness to grow. Thus the risk aversion of the Finnish microenterprises further increases the financial 
problems they face. 
The methods to finance growth vary substantially. According to FVCA, among all sizes of companies that 
are planning to grow fast in the near future 40 % will seek external finance. The figure for small and 
medium sized companies is usually almost twice as large, being almost 80%. From small and medium 
sized high growth companies that are going to seek external finance 65% will approach banks, 46% 
Finnvera, 30% venture capitalists, 6% insurance companies and 23% other sources.  
In Finland, there are quite many large formal venture capital firms. Some of them are completely and 
some only partly owned and financed by the Finnish government. These include for example Finnvera, 
Tekes, Finnish Industry Investment Ltd, Veraventure, Finnish Foundation for Innovations and Sitra. I 
introduce them briefly, expect for the Finnish Foundation for Innovations since it is discussed already 
earlier in the thesis.  
Finnvera is a government owned financial institution. Its primary goal is to help young growth firms to 
receive financing, grow and internationalize. Tekes on the other hand supports research, development 
and innovation activities in Finland. Its aim is to provide finance and knowhow to technology based firms 
and also, to help them to network with important contacts. Besides financing private companies, Tekes 
gives financial support to public companies and research projects as well as to municipals and 
universities among other public institutions. Sitra is a self-sufficient fund subject to public law. It 
functions under the Finnish parliament. Sitra’s objective is to enhance the competitiveness of Finnish 
companies and to improve the welfare in Finland. Finnish Industry Investment Ltd is a government-
owned investment company. Its primary investment methods are equity investments and it makes 
investments in venture capital funds, private equity funds and directly to selected target companies. The 
organization is administered by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (Lauriala 2004).  
An obvious common feature of the above discussed venture institutions is that they finance innovative 
growth companies that are already established. This group does not include startup and seed stage 
companies. Thus as a conclusion, the formal venture institutions might be proper sources of investment 
and growth capital for small established enterprises but not for startup and seed stage enterprises. 
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In the venture capital market in Finland there were also 46 private equity houses and venture capitalists 
in 2004 (Lauriala 2004). In addition, there is a large number of venture capital communities in Finland. 
The Finnish Venture Capital Association (FVCA) is an umbrella organization for many of them. FVCA 
attends to the communities interests, supports research in the field and connects venture capitalists 
with firms that need venture financing.  
Below figure depicts the Finnish private equity market. 
 
Figure 1. The private equity sector in Finland from the supply perspective (source Maula et al. 2007) 
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Tuli, Liksa, Vara, Kepara and Akuppi are different financing projects by Tekes10. All the projects include 
different financing instruments. The FoF is an abbreviation for funds of funds, VC for venture capital and 
FII for Finnish Industry Investment Ltd. 
Maula et al. (2007) demonstrate the turbulence in the Finnish venture capital market. According to the 
researchers, the amount of private investors fell from over 60% in 2000 to as low as 30% in 2005 in the 
early stage investor group. They also note that the amount of business angels in the register of Sitra’s 
INTRO market place accounted for 450 (in 2006) while the number ten years ago in Sitra’s Matching-
service (in year 1996) was just 100. Fortunately, the amount of business angels has increased 
substantially over the ten year period. I believe the trend is ongoing. On the 2nd of November 2010, it 
was presented in the media that some of such Finnish business owners that either had sold their own 
enterprises or in some other way had accumulated much wealth in year 2009, had already now become 
business angels (Yleisradio). The report also suggested that much of the business angel investments 
were made in the local businesses.  
 3.2.2 The evolution of the venture capital markets in Europe and Finland 
This subsection describes both the evolution and the current situation of the venture capital markets in 
Europe and Finland. I take the view of both the financiers and the enterprises in my presentation. I will 
also briefly demonstrate the overall private equity market in the Europe. I start the section with a 
discussion about the financial environment for small enterprises and especially how it has changed 
during recent years and what consequences the changes have had.  
The financial circumstances in all over the world have changed in recent years. The major causes have 
been the financial crisis, tightened conditions in the legislation and regulation (Basel 2 and 3 regulations 
for example), and other changes in the financial sector11. Due to the changes in the financial markets, 
banks are directing loans and credits to larger and less risky companies. Vasilescu (2009) argues that 
authorities and policymakers are so slow in their decisions to answer to the changing financial 
environment, that small and medium-size enterprises in Europe have increasingly started to look for 
                                                          
10
 Some examples of the projects. Under the project Tuli, a maximum of €10 000 is granted to an enterprise for the 
purchase of expert services that aid in product commercialization. An enterprise participating in the LIKSA program 
receives a grant a maximum of €20 000 from Tekes, and in addition, a €20 000 convertible loan from Sitra to buy 
support for business plan development which should improve investment readiness. 
11
 For more information about the Basel 2 regulation see Casu, Girardone and Molyneux (2006): Introduction to 
Banking. 
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alternatives to loan financing. The alternatives include equity, debt-equity combinations, leasing, and 
guaranteed loans and equity (Vasilescu 2009). 
Also formal venture capitalists are set against young innovative companies since they are high risk 
investments. For example, venture funds have legal duty concerning the manner they invest and thus 
they tend to invest in less risky companies than the micro firms. Often formal venture institutions 
finance such enterprises that already have established their businesses and usually there is also a lower 
bound in the company size that the institutions require (as proposed above in the presentation of 
formal venture capitalists). In addition, the changes in the world economy have directed formal venture 
capitalists to invest in less risky targets and thus nowadays they finance already established companies 
and make follow-on investments.  
Entrepreneurs have noticed that the access to finance has increasingly become long-term constraint to 
growth (Confederation of Finnish Industries 2008; Mason 2005 and 2008; Rainio 2009 and Riding 2008). 
The main causes considered by entrepreneurs themselves are the already above mentioned new 
economic circumstances that the international financial crisis caused and the changing banking sector 
but also the increased sophistication of entrepreneurs themselves.  
As bank debt is decreasing in importance, informal venture capital has become important for 
microenterprises. It is necessary for such reason that the financing problem is especially acute when an 
enterprise has not yet reached the size that most venture capital institutions require. Literature suggests 
that business angels may act as an important link between the initial investments of the entrepreneur, 
family and friends, and the later involvement of other investors, including venture capital institutions 
and the public sector (Mason 2008 and Vasilescu 2009 among others). Also it turns out that besides 
literature, the real investment cases prove that business angels finance young microenterprises and 
venture capital firms invest at later stages in firms’ life-cycles (figure 2). The point is also noted by 
Aernoudt (2005), Mason (2005), and Markova and Petkovska-Mircevska (2009). They found similar 
results to Vasilescu (2009) and others, that business angels have become more important in the 
financing of microenterprises since formal venture capitalists and banks move towards larger deals and 
shift their investments to later stages of firm development. 
Figure 2 depicts the suggested capital options for companies at different stages of firm development.  
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Figure 2. The role of business angels on the firm’s development (source Vasilescu 2009) 
Before depicting the European and the Finnish venture capital markets, I present figures and pictures 
from the United States (the US). The objective is to provide some base for comparison between the 
most successful and the most developed venture capital market, the United States venture capital 
market, and the European and the Finnish counterparts.  
The below graph presents the total dollar amount of venture capital investments made between years 
2000 and the first three quarters of 2010 in the United States. From the peak year in 2000 the invested 
amounts have decreased enormously. 
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Figure 3. Total amount of capital invested in the United States venture capital market between years 2000-2010 (source 
National Venture Capital Organization) 
According to Sohl and Sommer (2007), business angels have historically financed ten times more startup 
companies than venture capital funds in the United States. The researchers estimated that there were 
400 000 business angels investing $30 to $40 billion per year in 50 000 enterprises in 2007. In addition to 
financing seed and startup companies, business angels were increasingly investing in post-seed and post 
startup companies. 35% of investments were directed to enterprises in those stages. On the other hand, 
expansion stage investing increased the most resulting in 21% of all investments. Nevertheless, new 
investments represented 63% of business angel investment activity. In relation to the preceding 
argumentation, the below figure presents the investments by stages of firm development for the whole 
venture capital sector in the United States. The trend seems to be similar to the European and the 
Finnish venture capital investments (discussed below): most investments are directed to more 
established enterprises than the startup and seed stage companies. 
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Figure 4. Total amount of venture capital invested by stage of firm development between years 2000 and 2010 in the United 
States (source National Venture Capital Organization) 
In the below figure the trend of private equity investments in Europe is depicted. The figure indicates 
that the trend in the European private equity market before the financial crises and the economic 
downturn was increasing but after the major events, the invested amounts dropped substantially. The 
figure doesn’t indicate in which direction the year 2010 is heading; whether the private equity market is 
healing or the decreasing trend is ongoing. The graph should not however be compared with the figure 
depicting the venture capital market in the United States since the European numbers include all private 
equity (venture capital belongs to the group private equity among other financial instruments). Due to 
the lack of research and statistics about the European venture capital investments, figure 6 depicts the 
percentages that indicate how much money is spend on venture capital in some countries compared to 
the gross domestic product (GDP). From the figure, it is not difficult to draw conclusions that the 
European venture capital market is less deep and less developed than the venture capital market in the 
United States. 
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Figure 5. The invested amounts in the European venture capital market during years between 2000 and 2009 (source European 
Venture Capital Organization) 
 
Figure 6 The amount of venture capital in relation to GDP in some countries in 2007 (source Rainio 2009) 
Comparing to the United States capital market, in Europe the entrepreneurs are much more dependent 
on bank loans and overdrafts for early-stage financing. The lack of risk capital creates the worst 
problems for young enterprises since, as proposed previously, loan financing is more expensive, less 
flexible and less secure alternative than risk capital and also frequently available only under favorable 
economic conditions (Vasilescu 2009). 
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According to Rainio (2009), the value of informal investments in Europe is 10% of the value that is 
invested in the US. She argues that the longer history of venture capital markets in the US explains the 
difference in investment activity. On the other hand, Vasilescu (2009) proposes that market 
fragmentation, institutions and regulations, and taxation as well as paucity of high-tech small and 
medium-size enterprises, human resources and entrepreneurial culture are reasons for the sluggish 
development of the European venture capital market. 
Investors regard also risk differently in the two continents. Investments to young new firms yield lower 
returns in Europe compared to the US, which ultimately means that the European investors are more 
reluctant to invest in young companies than the US counterparts (it can be assumed that the risk levels 
in both continents are quite the same but as mentioned, the rates of return differ). Also, high due 
diligence costs for small deals in Europe often prevent entrepreneurs from receiving early stage 
financing. As a result, venture capital has been used to finance management buyouts and the later 
stages of firm development rather than seed and startup stages. According to European Commission 
report (2003), only 17% of formal European venture capital went to seed and startup investments 
(Rainio 2009). 
According to Mason (2008), among many others, the European business angel market is currently 
evolving from an invisible, atomistic market dominated by individual and small ad hoc groups of angel 
investors. The direction seems to be towards a more organized and professional market place in which 
angel syndicates are becoming increasingly significant (the angel syndicates will be discussed in more 
detail below) (May and Simmons; 2001; May and O’Halloran, 2003). The organization of the business 
angel market could increase the market efficiency and thus direct more funds to microenterprises. At 
least, the increasing organization might make the business angel activities more visible, which could 
then help the academics to propose suitable policy actions that could indirectly affect the market 
efficiency.  
There has been a remarkable structural change in the Finnish enterprise financing sector. The 
importance of financial institutions has diminished substantially while the significance of stock markets 
has increased. Due to globalization and development of the Finnish capital markets, the financing 
opportunities firms nowadays face have diversified substantially. However, loans are still an important 
form of financing (Rainio 2009).  
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In Finland, venture capital markets began to develop and grow in the early 1990’s. Risks as well as 
financial instruments have diversified, grown and developed during that time. Nevertheless, the venture 
capital market is still rather small and the operating culture is young. The venture capital market is too 
small to operate efficiently, be competitive and liquid. According to Rainio (2009), despite these 
circumstances, the Finnish venture capital market is credible and transparent and it has grown steadily 
from the beginning.  
According to the Finnish Venture Capital Association (FVCA), startup companies received the most 
venture financing, both in terms of value and number of investments in 2009. The number of start-up 
companies that received financing was 98 (104 in 2008) the total value being €42 million (€48 million in 
2008). The amount of seed stage companies that received venture financing was 60 (66 in 2008) and the 
total value reached €11 million (€11 million also in 2008). The later stage companies received venture 
capital by €29 million (€58 million in 2008) and the number of the companies was 29 situating both in 
Finland and abroad (FVCA). 
Since the interest in the thesis is on the technology oriented growth companies, I briefly present also the 
capital raising activities by high-tech growth firms. The capital source is either Finnish or foreign venture 
capital fund or business angel. The presented study is the most recent Technopolis Online Research and 
the investment period in question is the first half of 2010. The results indicate that 28 Finnish high-tech 
growth companies raised €49,5 million (€54,3 million in the first half of 2009) risk capital during the first 
six months of 2010. The number of business angel investments decreased by 60%, while the decrease in 
the overall amount of invested capital was only 28%. The value of the domestic formal investments 
increased by 15% from that of last year, while the value of foreign formal investments decreased by 
35%.  
In the first half of 2010, the domestic venture capitalists increased the average investment sums while 
the total amount of capital invested stayed the same. Only 10 angel investors invested either alone or in 
a group. The number of angels investing in the first half of 2009 was 25. Also, the value of the business 
angel investments decreased from €4,8 million to €3,5 million. According to the survey, the number of 
seed stage investments decreased from 37% to 25% of all investments (Technopolis 2010).  
Business angel investments could be viewed as accelerating the overall level of business angel 
investments. The more there are business angels that invest in successful microenterprises the more 
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there can be new business angels in the future churning the favor to new microenterprises. As the 
below presentation will verify, there are many motives behind business angel investments, one of them 
being the aspiration to aid the younger generations of entrepreneurs to succeed.  
Although there has been development in the informal venture capital sector, the volume of informal 
venture capital in Finland is anything but good compared to other countries. According to the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), the volume of informal venture capital as a percentage of GDP in 
Finland was among the lowest of the participating countries in 2005 (Maula et al. 2007).  
A note should be presented about the accuracy of the measures of business angel investments. 
According to research, the calculations of the amounts invested by business angels are an 
underestimate of the actual size of the informal venture capital market. First, most business angels have 
further investable funds available but they cannot identify appropriate investment opportunities 
(Coveney and Moore, 1998; Mason and Harrison, 1994, 2002). It is argued that this uncommitted capital 
is substantial. Second, there is a substantial pool of potential, or virgin, business angels who share the 
characteristics of active angels but have not yet entered the market. Often virgin angels are constantly 
looking for suitable investment targets that could serve as first investments.  
The below figure demonstrates the amount of venture capital that is invested in the start-up and seed 
stage companies in Finland during 1997 and 2007. 
9
62
68
135 140
99
84
40
69
45
71
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Venture capital financing in startup and seed stage companies in 
Finland 1997-2007 (million Euros) 
Total amount 
invested per year (in 
million, €)
 
Figure 7. Venture capital financing in start-up and seed stage companies in Finland 1997-2007 (source Rainio 2009) 
56 
 
After the peak years in the beginning of the decade, the amount of venture capital invested in startup 
and seed stage companies have halved. Fortunately the trend seems to be slightly upwards, although 
the amounts fluctuate strongly. An interesting finding is that the Finnish venture capital market had its 
peak in 2001 whereas as the figure 5 proposes the European private equity markets peaked much later, 
in 2007. 
The next graph clearly shows the trend in the venture capital market that is proposed already before in 
the thesis: venture capital investments are directed to already existing companies that have established 
their businesses. 
 
Figure 8. Venture capital investments in enterprises with different phases of development in 2007 in Finland (source Rainio 
2009) 
As argued, there is much potential in the informal capital market if the true investing volumes could be 
unleashed. In Finland, there is currently much discussion about the means by which business angel 
capital could be utilized more thoroughly. Legislation and taxation may, and to my opinion should, 
change in the future to better support the financing activities of business angels and small firms. Rainio 
(2009) and Paasivirta and Aaltonen (2003) present some suggestions in their researches about the 
means that could make the informal capital market more efficient. 
Below I present clear empirical evidence that supports the arguments that first of all, formal venture 
capitalists do not usually invest in microenterprises and for the second, the informal capital market is 
too small. Also, the concept of equity gap is presented. 
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According to the European Business Angel Network (EBAN), formal venture capitalists invest a minimum 
of €2.5 million in companies. It is argued in the EBAN website, that a minimum investment as large as 
€2.5 million leaves a market gap, or failure, in smaller amounts of equity. According to EBAN, business 
angels invest between €20.000 and €250.000. Although there is an enormous gap between the amounts 
individual business angels invest and the minimum amount venture capital funds invest, the gap can be 
decreased if business angels co-invest with other investors (that is business angels form a syndicate) or 
they invest through a co-investment fund (EBAN).  
Mason (2008) addresses the same matter. In addition to EBAN, Mason (2008) argues that venture 
capital funds are constantly increasing the minimum size of the investments and they are increasingly 
abandoning the early stage market, that is startup and seed stage enterprises. As it is proposed in the 
EBAN website, also Mason (2008) proposes that the equity gap could be reduced in the future since 
business angel syndicates are increasingly emerging.  
 According to Mason (2008), angel syndicates solve the inefficiency problem in the business angel 
market as well narrow down the equity gap12. The equity gap is in the £0,5 million to £2 million range 
(Mason 2008) or from €0,25 million to €2,5 million (EBAN). Usually the capital amounts entrepreneurs 
request that fell in the equity gap area, are too large for the founder himself, his family or friends to 
invest and too small for the venture capitalists. Thus the only source of venture capital in the range is 
provided by business angels alone or in syndicates (Mason 2008). 
Fortunately, the situation in the venture capital market in Finland seems to be somewhat better 
compared to the European situation. In Finland, for example Tekes and Sitra provide capital in smaller 
amounts and thus they increase the supply of capital directed to smaller firms. As a result, the equity 
gap could be narrower in Finland.  
In the below figure, I depict the amounts of venture capital demanded in Finland during years 2004 and 
2005. It can be noticed from the figure, that companies demanding less than €600 000 meet the most 
competition in the financial market. According to the figure, there is the same equity gap in the Finnish 
venture capital market as is in the European market. In fact, the typical business angel investment is in 
                                                          
12
 The angel market has traditionally been characterized as inefficient since the fragmented and invisible nature of 
angels. Business angel syndicates are more visible and thus easier for the entrepreneurs to approach (Mason 
2008).  
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the range of €10 000 - €150 000 (Suomen Bisnesenkelit Ry). Nevertheless, as proposed above, some 
venture capital institutions provide also small amounts of capital and the lower range of demanded 
capital is fulfilled somewhat better compared to Europe when the venture institutions are also providing 
capital in that range.  However, this argument does not take into account the fact that venture 
institutions do not provide capital to microenterprises. Thus, although venture institutions provide also 
smaller amounts of capital, the financial situation of microenterprises is not any better. However, as 
microenterprises hardly demand large amounts of capital, it could be argued that such companies do 
not suffer from the capital shortage that the equity gap generates. 
 
Figure 9 Market-level early stage venture capital deal flow and realized investments by size (source Rainio 2009) 
According to Rainio (2009), informal investors in Finland are quite risk averse. She claims that the risk 
aversion creates shortage of funds in the market and the shortage of venture capital financing 
accumulates especially on startup and seed stage companies (which also supports the findings in figure 
9). Also, when young growth firms receive informal capital the amounts are too small, as is the case also 
in Europe (Rainio 2009). Business angel syndicates would clearly enhance the efficiency of the venture 
capital market in Finland. Besides providing larger amounts of capital, business angel syndicates could 
share the risks together and thus the syndicates would help to solve the problems risk aversion creates. 
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 3.2.3. The economic significance of informal venture capital market from an economic 
 development perspective 
The informal venture capital market is important for the economic development at national, local and 
regional scales. The following presentation summarizes the most important features of informal venture 
capital proposed already earlier in the thesis. 
 According to Mason (2005), there are three aspects of the informal venture capital market that are 
significant from an economic development perspective. 
For the first, the amount business angels are able to invest and have invested is significant. The 
economic significance of the invested amounts stems from the targets that receive the capital. Mason 
(2005), as well many other scholars noted that business angels provide capital to entrepreneurs that 
would not otherwise receive any outside financing since the amount they are willing to accept is far too 
small for the formal venture capitalists to be interested in. Thus as presented earlier, angel financing fills 
at least the lower parts of the equity gap and the reason for the significance results from the size of the 
investment. In terms of stage of business development, investments by business angels are skewed 
toward the seed, startup and early growth stages whereas venture capital funds focus on later stage 
deals (Mason 2005, among many others). 
For the second, the economic significance of the informal venture capital market stems from the hands-
on involvement of business angels in their investee businesses. Demand-side studies indicate that many 
entrepreneurs are seeking smart money and for this reason, business angels are valued ahead of other 
funding sources (Mason 2007; Cressy and Olofsson, 1997; Sætre, 2003). The entrepreneurs business 
angels finance derive considerable value from the expertise, knowledge and experience angels pass on 
through their hands-on involvement.  This increases the prospects that the entrepreneurs’ businesses 
will succeed. Indeed, Mason (2005) notes that entrepreneurs often report that the hands-on 
involvement of business angels is more valuable than the capital they provide. 
Yet other researchers have noted the importance of the hands-on contributions business angels provide. 
Vasilescu (2009) argues that the most valuable contribution business angels have is experience, both in 
company’s operating field and in general management. Lindström and Olofsson (2001) point out that 
entrepreneurs are constantly emphasizing that the experience business angels have acquired is even 
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more important than the actual financing. Particularly for technology-oriented startups this is crucial, 
and these firms have also ranked business and strategic advice as the primary contribution they 
required from their investors, followed by money and contacts. 
For the third, the contribution of informal venture capital to economic development arises from its 
geographical characteristics. According to Mason (2005), this has two dimensions. The first dimension 
refers to the fact that angels are everywhere. Gaston (1990)’s study found that there are four business 
angels for every 1000 individuals in the US (Mason 2005). Second, various studies indicate that the 
majority of investments made by business angels are local. As a conclusion, there is a local feature in the 
angel investments: angel investors identify most of their investments through personal networks, they 
have a hands-on investment style and a consequent need for frequent contact with the investee 
businesses. Yet another two conclusions can be drawn. First, in most areas outside of major financial 
centers and technology clusters, business angels are the only source of risk capital. Second, the informal 
venture capital market is an important mechanism to retain and recycle wealth within the region it was 
created. 
3.3 Business angels 
In this section business angel characteristics are introduced. The following chapter (chapter 4) proposes 
the value adding mechanisms: business angels are seen to perform four roles in the investee 
enterprises. The performance of the roles is possible since business angels have below discussed 
competencies; the roles cannot be performed, or at least cannot be performed successfully, if business 
angel does not have the necessary human and social capital. The fourth chapter argues that the business 
angel characteristics can be channeled into higher firm performance by the performed roles. However, 
before going any further, the following picture clarifies the preceding arguments and also ultimately in 
the thesis. The purpose of the different colors in the arrow and in the box outlines proposes the effects 
business angels have on enterprises and on economic growth. Due to the personal characteristics and 
the involvement with the investee enterprise, business angels increase the firm growth rate (depicted 
by the darker red area surrounding “enterprise” in the picture). As a consequence, also the impact the 
enterprise has on economic growth increases (depicted by the darker red arrow and the darker red 
surroundings of “economic growth”). 
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Figure 10 The effect business angels have on enterprises and economic growth 
According to countless studies, there is a stereotype of an angel and thus some typical characteristics 
are often related to business angels. The characteristics are presented shortly. To begin with, a short 
history for the expression “business angel” is provided.  
The term “business angel” originates from England. It was first used to describe wealthy individuals who 
provided money for theatrical productions. The term was used for the first time in the context it is 
nowadays known in 1978. William Wetzel, professor at the University of New Hampshire and the 
founder of its Center for Venture Research, completed a pioneering study on how entrepreneurs raised 
seed capital in the USA and began to use the term “angel” to describe the investors that supported them 
(Vasilescu 2008). Wetzel can be held as the pioneer in the business angel research and writers refer to 
him in many occasions, especially when describing seminal findings.  
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 3.3.1. The stereotype of an angel investor 
The literature proposes that there is a stereotype of an angel investor. The below presentation follows 
Mason (2005) but the same classification can be found from numerous studies, whether in completely 
similar manner or with some features left out (Markova and Petkovska-Mircevska 2009; Vasilescu 2009; 
Shane and Heights 2008; and Wetzel and Seymour 1981, among others). 
Substantial net worth. A fundamental feature of business angels is that they are often regarded as high 
net worth individuals (HNIW). According to EBAN (Suomen Bisnesenkelit ry), business angels invest 
normally between €25 000 and €200 000 (€10 000 - €150 000) in one enterprise. Typically angel 
investors have a portfolio of two to five investments, but it is not exceptional to find angels that invest in 
even more targets. As noted also by Vasilescu (2009), business angels will not put their personal well-
being and life-style at risk but rather invest only some proportion of their total wealth.  Due to the high 
risk business angels take on when investing in unquoted companies, most of them allocate just 5%–15% 
of their overall investment portfolio to such investments. The preceding arguments imply that business 
angels on average are high net worth individuals. 
Investing own money. Business angels provide capital of their own compared to formal venture 
capitalists: their investable capital is collected from such sources as pension funds, banks and 
foundations, among others.  
Direct. Business angels make direct investments to enterprises. It implies that business angels have both 
personal networks that will provide a flow of investment opportunities and the competence to assess 
new young entrepreneurial companies. 
Time and expertise. Business angels provide more than just capital. They give their own expertise, 
knowledge and networks for the use of the entrepreneurs.  
Unquoted companies. Angel investors invest in unquoted companies: although there is evidence that 
angels have invested in companies in all sorts of situations, including management buyouts, buy-ins, 
rescue and turnaround situations, their typical investment is in new or recently started business. 
Financial gain. Business angels make investments in order to achieve a financial return. Typically the 
financial return is realized in an acquisition of the investee company or in an initial public offering (IPO). 
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In addition, Rainio (2009) found that in Finland the financial gains are increasingly realized by selling the 
investee firms to foreign investors or companies.  
 3.3.2. Main types and features 
The below grouping proposes that however there are some typical characteristics most business angel 
have, there exists also great heterogeneity among them. Although business angels usually invest in 
early-stage enterprises, there are also businesses angels that invest in such companies that experience 
positive cash flows even already at the time of the investment. Other angels have low involvement with 
founders and the companies they have invested in, while others actively invest also their own time. 
Angel investors differ a lot also by means of naivety, angel investment experience and sophistication 
among other aspects. These and many other features are specified below. 
According to Mason (2005), a typical business angel has the following properties. 
Male. Studies from across countries confirm that up to 95% of all business angels are males (Harrison 
and Mason, 2005; Mason, 2007). 
In the 45–65 year age group. According to Mason (2005), this definition reflects the required length of 
time that is needed to build a significant personal net worth. Also at this age range people with a 
successful business career might chose, or are forced to, quit. Entrepreneurs that have cashed out and 
are in their middle-ages often became business angels since they get bored with all the spare time.  
Successful cashed-out entrepreneurs. Many business angels have experience in building and growing an 
enterprise. Mason (2008; 11) retells Freer et al. (1992; 379) as follows. Angels “have acquired the kind of 
experience . . . that it takes to start, manage and harvest a successful entrepreneurial venture. In a sense 
their entire professional careers have prepared them to conduct the due diligence necessary to evaluate 
the merits and risks of prospective investments and to add value of their knowhow to the ventures they 
bankroll.” The rest of business angels are typically either people who have held senior positions in large 
companies or have specialist commercial skills and are involved in working with entrepreneurial 
companies (for example accountants, consultants, lawyers). Their wealth is derived from high income.  
Well-educated. Business angels’ economic success is based on high education level. Business angels 
typically have a university degree and/or high professional qualifications.  
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During my research I noted the following: although research on angel investing has largely focused on 
Western developed economies, the above proposed characteristics are remarkably similar across 
countries. There appeared to be exceptions only in some Asian countries, including for example Japan 
(Tashiro 1999) and Singapore (Wong and Ho 2007).  
The following categorization of angel investors follows Vasilescu (2009). The author classifies business 
angels by their investor profiles: 
Corporate angels: A business angel who invests his severance or early-retirement payment. Corporate 
angel is usually a former senior manager from a large corporation. This type of  investor is motivated to 
help others achieve what he has achieved and to generate greater financial returns from higher risk 
ventures; 
Entrepreneurial angels: A successful, often former entrepreneur. This type of angel seeks to diversify his 
investment portfolio or to expand his current business. Angels belonging to this  group are the most 
active ones and they also invest the largest amounts, generally up to $500 000;  
Professional angels: An angel investor who has achieved wealth and experience through his professional 
career as a doctor, lawyer, banker, an accountant or as a formal venture capitalist. Professional angel 
finds potential investment opportunities through his business dealings and professional networks. The 
business angel prefers to invest in such an enterprise that offers a service or a product that he has 
experience in. Professional angel usually offers his sector expertise to the investee firm and thus also 
engages with the business; 
Enthusiast angels: Less professional investor (compared to the counterpart, the entrepreneurial  angel) 
in his later years. He invests in firms more as a hobby; 
Micromanagement angels: This type of an investor prefers great control over the firm he invests in. 
Micromanagement angel often micromanages from a seat on a company’s board rather than through 
active participation in the everyday management. 
Coveney and Moore (1998) grouped business angels based on their level of entrepreneurial and 
investment activity:  
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Entrepreneur angels: The most active business angel when measured by the number of investments 
made and the total amounts invested. Angel investors in this group are the most experienced and 
wealthy ones compared to the business angels in other groups. They prefer to invest in companies that 
are at the startup stage. The major motive behind the investment is enjoyment. Entrepreneur angels are 
the most probable ones to make investments outside of their own field of experience. They are unlikely 
to play a role in the day-to-day management of their investee companies. 
Income seeking angels: Significantly less wealthy and active investors compared to the entrepreneurial 
angels. Income seeking angels are rather motivated by the job itself and income and less by the fun and 
enjoyment the investment project could generate. These angels tend to invest in industries which they 
are familiar with and they look for a formal management role in the ventures.  
Wealth maximizing angels: Mainly self-made investors but the group includes also persons that have 
inherited their wealth. Wealth maximizing angels are interested primarily in the financial return. They 
usually invest in industries in which they have personal experience and they are likely to take a full-time 
position in their investee businesses. 
The final classification is provided by Benjamin and Margulis (2005). They define business angels based 
on their attitude and behavior. Authors argue that business angels differ with their investment 
motivations; what they are looking for from an investment. Benjamin and Margulis (2005) divide the 
angel group into nine different types. 
Value-added investor is an extremely experienced angel who has previously worked as an investment 
banker or venture capitalist. He has multiple investments at the same time and he spends time with the 
companies: value-added investor seeks to add value in the firms by contributing his accumulated 
knowhow in order to enhance the growth. Often this type of investor makes follow-on investments after 
a deep-pocket investor has invested much capital in a firm. Value-added investor seeks investment 
opportunities and often recommends investment targets to other investors. He has also a very strong 
network of co-investors who trust his judgment. Value-added investor is very active and he becomes 
involved often just for a little while.  
Deep-pocket investor has a background as an entrepreneur. Usually he has built and sold a company and 
then uses the proceeds to help other entrepreneurs to become successful. This investor type requires 
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the return on investment (ROI) to be as high as 50% per year. Deep-pocket investor emphasizes deal 
structure, prefers that investor(s) holds control and invests only in firms he knows in order to avoid risk. 
This investor type makes independent decisions to invest, suggests investment targets to others and 
takes leads from other investors but always relies on own judgment.  
The consortium of individual investors (could also be referred to as an informal syndicate) is a loose 
confederation of private, individual investors. They have experience in starting up, running and selling 
their businesses. Their activity level in the company is more of a passive: they seek oversight and work 
as sounding boards. Often the consortium invests in startup companies in technology, retailing and 
product areas. Although forming a consortium, business angels make their own decisions and may not 
always invest as a group. They are also actively connected with deep-pocket investors with whom they 
co-invest or to whom they refer deals. 
The partner investor is described by Benjamin and Margulis (2005) as buyer in disguise. He has a very 
high need for control, he seeks presidency from an investee company and he prefers local companies so 
that he can participate. The partner investor is trying to build a network or has developed some co-
investor relationships. The partner investor prefers acquisitions of established firms but usually lacks 
financial resources. He is the lead investor who searches for opportunities and makes independent 
decisions.  
The family of investors pools family’s money. Often a trusted and skilled family member coordinates 
investment activity. The family investor is very astute investor with high degree from school, at least the 
master of business administration (MBA). The investor contributes experience and intense involvement 
for a short period of time. The investor type is common among Asian investors in the US.  
The barter investor provides, in exchange for equity, what the entrepreneur would otherwise have 
bought elsewhere. This type of investor has often everything to provide from billing, invoicing and 
collecting to warehousing and shipping. Thus besides capital, he invests infrastructure. The barter 
investor invests in early-stage companies and is actively involved in the firm. The barter investor 
requires a significant equity position in the investee company. The venture must have capacity to grow 
to $10 million in minimum in three to five years.  
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Socially responsible private investor is nurture capitalist. He has a need for personal interactions and is 
less able to provide wise business support. Socially responsible private investor prefers to deal with 
entrepreneurs that have high values and ventures addressing major social issues. This type of investor 
usually does not have entrepreneurial background: his has a great amount of wealth which is typically 
inherited. Due to the lack of experience in business, he prefers to take advices and recommendations 
from trusted advisors.  
The unaccredited private investor is typically less experienced and less wealthy individual than for 
example the value added investor. Despite of the inexperience he usually takes a role in a company. The 
investment period is quite small, from three to five years. The unaccredited private investor prefers to 
know the entrepreneur and he emphasizes the importance of a fair and hard-working owner. The 
investor makes multiple small investments ranging from $10 000 to $25 000. 
The manager investor has worked as a senior-level executive or as a former business owner and after 
retiring has much wealth to invest in a venture company. However, the manager investor has low 
tolerance for risk so he invests in more developed ventures. Usually this type of investor buys a position: 
he wants a role in the company he is investing in for an extended period of time. He is less experienced 
and normally makes just one investment.  
To conclude the chapter, I argue that it is obvious that business angels contribute much more than just 
financial aid in the investee enterprises. The entrepreneurs are expecting and demanding something 
that cannot be measured with currency and as they have revealed in many studies, entrepreneurs are 
looking for smart money and sector expertise from business angels. Thus in the relationship between 
the business angel and the entrepreneur there has to be other factors besides money business angels 
provide. The special factor creates so much value that the entrepreneurs are willing to pay for it and to 
hand over some power of the company. To my opinion, the missing factor is the experience, the 
knowhow and the hands-on work that the angels pass on. The above classification of business angels 
provide a firm ground to the argument that angel investors can and do provide human and social 
capital.  
According to studies, the value adding contributions can be framed: the angel investor takes on one or 
more roles in the investee enterprise. The above mentioned factors, experience, knowhow and hands-
on work that the entrepreneurs so often appreciate over capital, are conducted through the roles. The 
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next step in proving the value enhancing relationship between innovative microenterprises and 
economic growth and the all enabling influence business angels has on this relationship, is to discuss the 
value adding process.  
4. Investment process and the value added by business angels 
Before discussing the roles business angels perform, I briefly present the typical investment process 
proposed by literature and the agency problems that may prevail in the relationship between the 
business angel and the entrepreneur. 
4.1 Stages of the investment process 
According to Mason (2005 and 2009) and Haines et al. (2003) five discrete investment stages can be 
identified. 
1.  Deal origination  
2.  Deal evaluation, which can be divided into two sub-stages:  
- Initial screening  
- Detailed investigation  
3.  Negotiation and contracting  
4. Post-investment involvement  
5.  Harvesting  
Mason (2005) argues that agency theory provides a framework to study the above depicted investment 
process. According to the agency theory, an agency relationship exists when one individual (the 
principal) engages the services of another individual (the agent) to perform a service on his behalf. An 
important aspect of the agency relationship is that power, that is decision-making, and money are 
separated. It is precisely this separation of ownership and control that creates agency problems. In 
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practice, the principal, business angel, delegates the decision-making to the agent, the entrepreneur, 
while at the same time also capital is under the agent’s authority.  
According to Mason (2005), both the agent and the principal are assumed to be economic-maximizing 
individuals. The central concern of agency theory is opportunism. The separation of ownership and 
control creates risk that the agent will make decisions that are not in the best interests of the principal. 
This creates two types of risk for the principal. The first is adverse selection. Adverse selection results 
from informational asymmetries: the entrepreneur is better informed than the business angel 
about his true abilities. The entrepreneur may thus deliberately misrepresent his abilities to the 
angel investor. The second risk is moral hazard. In situations where it is not possible for the 
business angel to observe the behavior of the entrepreneur, the entrepreneur may shirk and 
engage in opportunistic behavior that is not in the interests of the angel investor. Also, he may 
pursue such interests that maximize his economic interest rather than that of the angel investor 
(Mason 2008). According to Mason (2005), these risks can be avoided by executing properly the 
investment process stages which are discussed next. 
1. Deal origination 
Mason (2005) argues that business angels adopt a relatively ad hoc and unscientific approach to 
identifying investment opportunities. Friends, family and business associates are the most significant 
sources of deal flow but angel investors receive business suggestions also from professional contacts like 
lawyers, accountants and stockbrokers as well directly from entrepreneurs. In some cases – especially in 
the case of ad hoc investors - the entrepreneur is not, according to Mason (2005), a stranger but a 
business associate who is known to the angel (client, supplier, among others). Since some studies clearly 
propose that angel investors rarely rely on public business suggestions, the sources of the suggestions 
must be included in the extensive and longstanding network of relationships (Mason 2005). 
Mason (2005, 2008) found that the personal aspect of the deal referral minimizes especially the adverse 
selection risk. By investing in firms that are referred by trusted business associates, friends and even 
family members decrease the risk that the agent behaves incorrectly. As Mason (2008; 16) comments, 
“even if the principals of the firm are unknown to the investors, if the investor knows and trusts the 
referral source, the risk is reduced”. Business referrals put the referee’s reputation, merits and 
credibility on the line, which then reduces the risk that the principal will behave incorrectly. 
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2. Deal evaluation  
Deal evaluation includes at least two stages: initial screening and detailed investigation (due diligence). 
After receiving business proposals, business angels investigate how the proposals fit with their own 
investment criteria. The first and foremost factor that determines whether the investment opportunity 
is suitable or not includes the personal and business skills that the business angel itself possesses. If the 
investment opportunity does not match the skills and competences the angel has, he is unable to 
provide more than the capital asked. If the answer to question “can I add value to the business” is 
negative, the business proposal is rejected. So following Mason (2005)’s arguments, it seems that 
business angels have realistic knowledge of themselves and on average they do not take projects that go 
beyond their competence. Other meaningful factors that affect the choice of investment are the 
requested amount of capital, the location of the business and all the other personal criteria the business 
angel may have.  
After initial screening the angel investor undertakes a quick review of the investment targets that fall 
within his investment criteria to derive some initial impressions. According to Mason (2005, 2008), the 
aim at this point of the decision-making process is simply to assess whether the proposal has sufficient 
merit to justify the investment of time to undertake a detailed evaluation. The market and the 
entrepreneur are the key considerations at this stage. Less significant are the product and/or service and 
financial factors (angels exhibit considerable skepticism about the value of financial information in the 
business plan of a startup company since the numbers are easy to come up with).  
The objective of the initial screening is to filter the most promising and suitable investment targets from 
the mass of opportunities. If the business proposal is accepted to the next level of evaluation, business 
angel reads the business proposal in detail (indeed the business proposal is often viewed just now). 
Angel wades through the financial information, visits the premises, does some personal research to 
gather additional information on market potential, competition and so on, and assesses the principals.  
3. Negotiation and contracting  
In the negotiation and contracting phase, business angel and the entrepreneur agree on terms 
considering valuation, structure of the deal (share price, type of shares, size of shareholding, timing) and 
the terms and conditions of the investment, including the investor’s role. In coping with the agency 
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problems, deal structuring, the mechanism that decides how to allocate rewards between the investor 
and the entrepreneur, attempts to align the behavior of the entrepreneur with that of the investor. 
On the other hand, the terms and conditions attempt to control the behavior of the entrepreneur. 
4. Post-investment involvement 
From an agency perspective, monitoring is the most important tool for the principal to mitigate the risk 
of the agent’s opportunistic behavior. According to Mason (2005), in line with this expectation, most 
business angels take an active role in the investee businesses.  
The post-investment phase includes various conventions (could also be referred to as different 
roles) that the angel investor performs. The post-investment activities are discussed in detail in the 
next section that concentrates on the value added contributions.  
5. Harvesting 
As discussed earlier in the thesis, investing in startup and seed stage companies involves high risk 
(Mason 2005). The most accepted strategy by academicians and business professionals to reduce the 
risk of an investment is to diversify the investment portfolio (Brealey et al. 2008; Bodie et al. 2005). 
However, this is not an option for the business angel. According to Mason (2005), there are three 
reasons. For the first, angels typically have just a handful of investments in their portfolios. Second, they 
often restrict their investments to sectors they know and understand which makes their portfolios 
undiversified at the industry level. Third, as the first external investor in a business and generally lacking 
the financial resources to make follow-on investments, business angels are vulnerable to being diluted 
when further funding rounds are required.  
The above claim about undiversified investment portfolios includes only investments made in certain 
type of enterprises (with certain type I refer to such companies that are usually the targets of informal 
venture financing, that is seed stage and startup companies in such sectors that the particular business 
angel has experience in). As stated in the presentation of business angels (section 3.3), the invested 
amount is often just from five to fifteen percentages of the total investment portfolio (for example 
Wetzel and Seymour 1981, and Shane and Heights 2008). To minimize the risks associated with 
undiversified investment portfolios, angel investors can follow the preferred investment theories by 
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investing in stocks, bonds, other debt instruments as well in art, apartments and other investment 
targets that do not correlate with angel investments. 
To conclude I provide some numbers that indicate clearly the small amount of business plans that 
business angels eventually approve. According to Mason (2005), a Canadian study by Riding et al. (1993) 
found that 72,6% of business proposals were rejected at the initial screening stage and further 15,9% 
were rejected following more detailed investigation. As the detailed investigation stage proceeded, 
another 6,3% were eliminated. Thus the cumulative rejection rate was 94,8%. Business angels proceed 
to the negotiation and contracting stage with only 5% of the investment opportunities they receive. 
4.2 The value added contributions by business angels 
Politis (2008), among others, noted that even though it is widely recognized that business angels 
generally contribute value added in addition to the financial investments, there is very little detailed 
investigation about the means and methods how the value added actually takes place. To correct the 
deficiency in research, Politis (2008) searched for scholar studies by taking advantage of some of the 
most well-known and highly used databases13. She gathered studies from all over the world. The 
research process identified 14 empirical studies published between 1992 and 2005 that gave detailed 
information about the business angels’ value added contributions and that also proved to be unbiased. 
The fourteen studies included data from the following countries among others: from the United 
Kingdom (Harrison and Mason 1992 and 1996), the United States (Ehrlich et al. 1994 and Ardichvili et al. 
2002), Germany (Brettel 2003), Finland (Lumme, Mason, and Suomi 1998), Japan (Tashiro 1999), 
Scotland (Paul et al. 2003) and Norway (Sætre 2003). 
Based on the fourteen research papers, Politis (2008) identified different hands-on actions business 
angels repeatedly seemed to perform. He aggregated the identified actions into a set of distinct but 
complementary value adding roles. Politis (2008) also linked the roles to theoretical perspectives that try 
to explain why the actions business angels take could have the potential to contribute to enhanced firm 
growth. 
                                                          
13
 These include for example Elton B. Stephens Company (EBSCO), the American Economic Association’s electronic 
bibliography (EconLit), Journal Storage (JSTOR) and British Library for Development Studies (BLDS). 
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For the first, I briefly present the Finnish study Politis (2008) included in his research. The Finnish study 
was conducted by Lumme, Mason and Suomi (1998). The authors found 22 different types of value 
adding contributions provided by business angels to their investee businesses. The 22 different types of 
contributions were divided into five main areas by the researchers that closely resemble the aggregated 
roles Politis (2008) suggests: strategic management and control, assistance in operational management 
and control systems, networking, industry knowledge and resourcing new dynamic business structures.  
Politis (2008) identified four value adding roles: 
• sounding board and strategic role; 
• supervision and monitoring role; 
• resource acquisition role; and 
• mentoring role. 
Following Politis (2008), I define the value adding roles and discuss also the links to the theoretical 
perspectives that explain why these roles have the potential to contribute to added value both at the 
firm and ultimately at the economy level. 
Sounding board and strategic role 
Politis (2008) found that the most frequently performed role reported in studies was acting as a 
sounding board. As a sounding board, the angel investor provides strategic advice to the entrepreneur 
based on his extensive business knowhow and management expertise that he has acquired during his 
career. Business angels perform the sounding board and strategic role in a number of ways. These 
include helping to formulate the business strategy, reflecting on ideas, enhancing the general pool of 
available management resources in the firm and giving advice on the manner and timing for how to 
realize the value created in the firm.  
According to the 14 studies, the prior business experience and management knowhow provide an 
important basis for adding value. Angel investors possess unique personal capabilities that give business 
angels an opportunity to combine a wide set of diverse competencies that are related to the enterprise 
(the founder, existing and potential employees, the business idea among others) in order to generate a 
successful entrepreneurial venture.  
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Theoretically, the business angel’s unique personal capabilities that contribute to value added in the 
investee enterprise can be explained by resource-based arguments. A firm’s internal environment and 
especially internal resources and capabilities are critical for creating sustainable competitive advantage.  
As Politis (2008) noted, young small firms often lack these internal resources, particularly in critical 
management areas such as finance and marketing. The business knowhow and management expertise 
provided by business angels may in this respect be considered as a key strategic resource for the firm. 
From the perspective of the resource-based theory, business angel’s human capital is a potential source 
of competitive advantage which could improve the investee firm’s competitive position. 
Supervision and monitoring role 
According to Politis (2008), the 14 studies revealed that supervision and monitoring role is the second 
most common form of value adding. The supervision and monitoring role is related to some extent to 
the principal-agent theory discussed briefly earlier. By supervising and monitoring the firm, business 
angel protects the investments made by the enterprise’s main resource providers (for example equity 
and debt holders, and employees) from the potential managerial misbehavior. Monitoring is commonly 
performed by instituting proper accounting information systems and by serving on the board of 
directors in the investee firms. According to Politis (2008), financial information and other checks among 
others enable the business angel to protect the assets of the firm, oversee operating matters and hold 
managers accountable for their actions. 
Supervision and monitoring role can be theoretically linked to agency theory arguments (Politis 2008). 
The separation of ownership from day-to-day decision making creates principal-agent relationship and 
induces agency problems between the parties. To reduce potential agency costs and maximize 
shareholder value, agency theory prescribes that outside investors should be actively involved in 
supervision and monitoring activities. Business angels may be expected to add value by exercising these 
activities to help to minimize potential asymmetric information problems and to reduce agency costs. 
Resource acquisition role 
The third activity angel investors perform is resource acquisition. Business angels add value to the 
investee companies by acquiring timely resources through their personal networks. Among others, 
timely resources include activities such as interfacing with investor groups, providing important business 
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contacts and raising additional funds (Politis 2008). The networking activities can be helpful in 
supporting the early development and growth of new small firms by developing and managing their 
network of connections with important stakeholders. Entrepreneurs are better prepared and informed 
of unexpected opportunities that arise in the marketplace, strategic windows (Politis 2008). 
Politis (2008) links the resource acquisition role to resource dependency perspective. The perspective 
emphasizes that the long-term survival and success of a firm depends on its ability to link with its 
external environment. According to the theory, a firm that wants to reduce dependency on resources 
should pay attention to critical relationships, assets and contacts in the external environment. By 
forming healthy, tight relationships, and acquiring strategically necessary assets and contacts, a firm is 
less dependent on external forces and variables that could in worst case affect the core business itself.  
Mentoring role 
The fourth value adding role is mentoring. Mentoring activities refer to the developmental relationship 
between the more experienced angel investor and the less experienced entrepreneur (Politis 2008). 
Business angel aims to build a stable and committed working relationship with the entrepreneur and 
according to the studies, angel investor is seen as a helpful, open and trustworthy partner. The activities 
reported in the studies included “providing moral support, lifting the spirits, sharing the burden, 
providing a broader view, and discussing and dealing with sensitive personal issues” (Politis 2008; 10). 
These mentoring activities can support important business operations, such as joint planning and 
problem solving based on social and relational methods.  
Mentoring role can be related to theories of relational governance14. Agency theorists emphasize mainly 
formally defined contracts to protect the equity investment. On the contrary, relational governance 
theorists argue on behalf of the importance of norm-driven definitions of proper behavior. The norm-
driven definitions are seen to regulate social relationships and social exchange between economic 
agents. The ongoing functional relationship between the entrepreneur and the angel investor will 
generally foster trust and enable the parties to build confidence between them and also to adopt more 
flexible models of partner cooperation. When there is a possibility of conflicting interest in the 
partnership, relational governance mechanisms become a necessary and efficient complement to formal 
                                                          
14
 More about relational governance can be found from e.g. Huse (1993) and Grandori (2006). 
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contracting mechanisms. Relational governance enhances continuance, reciprocity and bilateralism. 
Thus regarding to the relational governance perspective, business angel adds value with the mentoring 
role by instituting shared vision, mutual understanding and trust in the relationship between him and 
the entrepreneur. This in turn has the potential to reduce harmful conflicts and promote cohesion and 
long-term commitment (Politis 2008).  
 Table 1 summarizes the four value adding roles and the theoretical perspectives. 
 Value adding role   How do business angels add value?  Theoretical support 
 Sounding board/strategic  Building and protecting the bundle  Resource based theory 
 role    of valuable resources in the firm 
 Supervision and monitoring Minimizing conflicts of interest by  Agency theory 
 role    means of formal control mechanisms 
 Resource acquisition role  Creating and maintaining a stable   Resource dependency 
     flow of critical resources   theory 
 Mentoring role   Minimizing conflicts of interest by  Theories of relational  
     means of informal control mechanisms governance 
Table 1. Theoretical perspectives on how business angels add value (Politis 2008) 
To sum up I briefly present the above discussed four actions in two major dimensions which further 
proposes that the roles are complementary and linked to each other, in addition to been distinct (figure 
9).  
According to Politis (2008), the roles can be classified on the basis of their emphasis on value added. She 
notes that the role is either constructing a competitive resource base in a firm or governing the 
relationship between the business angel and the entrepreneur. The value added contributions that 
focus on securing the firm’s resources are the sounding board and strategic role and the resource 
acquisition role. The two remaining roles form the “governing the relationship between the 
organizational actors” dimension (Politis 2008; 12). 
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The second dimension classifies the contribution of the business angel itself. The angel investor has 
personal assets, social and human capital, that he has acquired throughout his professional career. 
Through different jobs, training and experience business angel has acquired human capital. It can be 
defined as a set of productive knowledge and skills. Social capital, on the other hand, can be defined as 
the location of an individual in a structure of relationships. This location can be very advantageous for 
the entrepreneur, since usually he has not yet itself reached such a position in a network of 
relationships. The sounding board and strategic role and the supervision and monitoring role relate to 
human capital and the resource acquisition role and the mentoring role to social capital (Politis 2008).   
    Value added based on human capital   Value added based on social capital 
   
 Resource provision  Sounding board/   Resource acquisition 
     strategic role    role 
 Governance   Supervision and   Mentoring role 
     monitoring role 
Figure 11. The value added roles and the two major dimensions (Politis 2008) 
The particular link between business angels and the enhanced business growth is empirically verified by 
many studies. In the current chapter, one part of the link is argued to be the angel investor’s personal 
involvement with the investee enterprise.  
In the next chapter, I present studies that have empirically confirmed the relationship between business 
angel investments, microenterprises and enhanced growth, both at the firm and the economy level. The 
aim of the chapter is to provide statistical support for my argument about the positive impact business 
angels have on growth levels. The presentation also verifies the importance of microenterprises for the 
wellbeing of a nation as well for the economic development since the higher growth rates witnessed in 
studies are related to young innovative microenterprises. The argument that microenterprises might be 
among the most important growth drivers in nations is supported by the empirical findings. 
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5. The empirical evidence on the impact of informal capital on economic 
growth 
5.1 Measurement issues 
As noted earlier, business angels are keen on their privacy and anonymity. Also, according to Mason 
(2008), business angels can be described as invisible and as it follows, there is no documentation of the 
nature of their investing. As opposite to the formal venture capital market, there are no lists or 
databases of business angels. Thus already Wetzel (1983; 26) observed, that the total population of 
business angels “is unknown and probably unknowable.”  Also, earlier research on business angels 
characterizes them with inconsistent definitions and this obviously hinders knowledge accumulation and 
future empirical research15.  
There are two consequences that follow from the preference for anonymity (Mason 2008). First, at the 
macro scale it has not been possible to accurately measure the number of business angels or their 
investment activity on either cross-sectional (static) or time-series basis. Also, even the population of 
business angels is not fixed or static. As Mason (2008) argues, there are several studies that have 
identified a significant minority of virgin angels who actively look for their first investment targets. 
Second, micro scale research on business angels has had to identify business angels through a variety of 
imperfect sources. According to Mason (2008), as a result there is no way in which to test for the 
representativeness of the generated business angel samples. Indeed, many studies are based on 
samples of convenience. These samples include for example angels who are members of business angel 
networks or such angels that are sampled by snowball sampling methods (chain-referral). Both methods 
are likely to generate biased samples16. The difficulties in finding business angels has also meant that 
most samples are small, which also relates to the representativeness problem. However, progress is 
                                                          
15
 Avdeitchikova et al. (2008) made a thorough investigation of the definitional obstacles of business angels as well 
of the grey area and sampling methods suggested and revealed by earlier research. More information about the 
subject can be found from their article.  
16
 Snowball sampling method is a research sampling technique that is used with hidden populations.  In the 
snowball sampling technique, existing research participants recruit possible future subjects among their 
acquaintances. As a result, the sample group appears to grow like a rolling snowball (Salganik and Heckathorn 
2004). Research points that the snowball method is likely to be biased but however, there are other techniques 
emerging. These include respondent-driven sampling technique which, according to Salganik and Heckathorn 
(2004) and Heckathorn (2007), allows researchers to make asymptotically unbiased estimates about hidden 
populations. 
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constantly being made with such data sources that enable more accurate estimates of the researched 
population (e.g. Avdeitchikova et al (2008); Farrell et al. 2008; Riding 2008). 
As a result of the anonymity, there has to be at most only a few macro level studies that include purely 
business angels in the sample group. Unfortunately, I was not able to find any. Thus some of the 
following presentation of the impacts venture capital has on economic growth includes all venture 
capitalists. Nevertheless, I find it useful to shortly discuss the results since they are highly convincing. 
Also as presented earlier, formal (especially private formal venture capitalists) and informal venture 
capitalists provide similar value adding contributions for the investee enterprises and thus the results 
should be in line with the effects business angels alone are expected to provide.  
According to numerous studies, the reason why venture capitalists are assumed to impact the economic 
growth rates and the success of an enterprise are similar to the arguments I have given about the effects 
business angels have. These include first of all capital and for the second, the personal involvement of 
the investor. Thus, the factors behind the positive results found in empirical studies are similar to the 
factors business angels are proposed to contribute. 
As a convincing argument, I briefly discuss the findings by Luukkonen (2008). She compared the different 
contributions and activity levels formal and informal venture capitalists culminate in the investee firm. 
She found that business angels are actively “coaching” the investee firms which could relate to the roles 
discussed in the previous chapter.  The public sector venture capital organizations were least involved 
with the investee enterprises as well as least active in the “coaching” activities. On the other hand, 
private sector venture capitalists took advantage of formal control and monitoring mechanisms. 
Similarly to business angels, private venture capitalists were actively involved in “coaching” the investee 
enterprises (Luukkonen 2008). The research clearly indicates that the activities conducted by formal 
venture capitalists, especially by private venture capitalists, are similar to the ones conducted by 
business angels.  
In addition, despite both, formal and informal venture capitalists provide important knowledge in the 
form of human capital, to my opinion it is obvious that business angels tend to contribute it more and 
also more intensively. Literature suggests that angel investors usually have at most few ongoing 
investments at the same time which makes them more concentrated on one single firm at a time. Also 
the motivation to enhance firm growth is much stronger since it is business angels’ own money that is at 
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stake: the upside and downside potentials are enormous and the effect runs directly to the business 
angel (in contrast to a fund or institution manager). In addition, many business angels make investments 
since by investing, they are able to engage with businesses and help the entrepreneur make the 
enterprise successful, and for many angels that is the main goal (Mason 2005, 2008 among others). The 
institutional venture capitalists invest in enterprises because it is their job and this makes an enormous 
difference between the two investments. Due to the above argumentation, the intensity level that the 
formal and informal venture capitalists contribute is different, which to my opinion has an effect on how 
much effort they are actually contributing. The effects could be seen at last in the different growth rates 
the investee enterprises are performing. In fact, I assume that if the studies were made only with 
business angels, the results would be more extreme. 
In the second chapter I introduced the endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship as a proper and 
useful measuring and modeling tool for the effects entrepreneurship has on economic growth. As I 
argued already in the actual presentation of the theory, a new variable should be introduced in the 
model for it to better reflect the environment microenterprises are in and also the obstacles they face. I 
proposed that the new variable, ƒ, should depict the financial environment. The production function in 
the endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship is Y ()MN9O8P
O
 . The new variable 
affects only new microenterprises and thus it should affect the term MN9. I propose that ƒ should be 
added to the power term as follows: '  ()MN9Oƒ8P
O
, since the financial environment 
restrains the new microenterprise sector from functioning efficiently. 
5.2 The micro level evidence on the superior performance of business angel 
backed firms 
A vast amount of recent empirical research confirms the relationship between receiving venture capital 
and firm performance (e.g. Engel 2002; Schefczyk 2000). Engel (2002) studied the impact venture capital 
has on firm performance. The study confirmed that enterprises financed with venture capital actually do 
perform better due to the involvement of the venture capitalist. Engel (2002) as well as Berger and Udell 
(1998) and Gompers and Lerner (1999) emphasize three reasons why venture backed firms outperform 
non-venture backed firms: pre-investment screening, monitoring and value adding. According to Engel 
(2002) and Sapienza (1992), given a positive relationship between the services venture investors provide 
and the performance of an enterprise, the impact on firm performance is supposed to be larger in firms 
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with a high innovation level. Due to this finding, Engel (2002) and Sapienza (1992) argue that the 
venture capitalists role in an enterprise increases with the innovation level of the company.  
Engel (2002) studied the impact of venture capital on new firm growth. As an indicator for growth, Engel 
(2002) used employment data. According to the results, venture capitalists push the investee firms to a 
faster and higher growth than any other investor during a specified amount of time. The empirical 
results indicate that venture backed firms in high-tech industries achieved 42% annual employment 
growth rates (non-venture backed achieved only 14% growth rates). In addition, venture capital backed 
enterprises had 110% higher firm growth rates in relation to the group of non-venture backed firms with 
a similar amount of business activities in the high-tech industry. 
Hunter and Clarke (2009) have conducted the United Kingdom’s (the UK) largest study to date about the 
effects business angels have on the economic performance of enterprises. The research also gives 
information about the return rates business angels experience with their investments. The study 
included only business angels that were members of business angel networks and thus the results must 
be interpreted in the light of the sample limitations. However, the conclusions are similar to other 
studies and are well worth presenting.  
Hunter and Clarke (2009) came across the following findings. The most likely outcome of an investment 
is failure. 56% of the investments made were exited with a loss, most of them losing the whole 
investment. This finding contributes to the acknowledged fact that business angel investment is highly 
risky. The rest, 44% of investments exited with substantial gains. The average of the liquidated capital 
was 2,2 times the invested capital. In their sample, 35% of all exits made solid returns generating from 
one to five times the invested capital. 9% of the exits generated ten times the invested amount. On 
average, the investment period was 3,6 years and the average investment had internal rate of return 
(IRR)17 as high as 22%. Similar numbers are also available for the United States (Hunter and Clarke 2009). 
For comparison, the average of the income generated by a successfully made exit was 2,6 times the 
investment, the average investment period being 3,5 years and the average IRR 27%.  
A similar study is conducted in Canada by Riding (2008). He found that business angels exit their 
investments with a loss in 26,7% of investment cases. The figure is clearly much smaller for the Canadian 
                                                          
17
 The definition for IRR can be found from Brealey, R., Myers, S & Allen, F (2008). 
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business angels than for the UK angels discussed above. 40,7% of the investments yield from 1% to 50% 
on the investments and 32,6% yield more than 50% on the investment.  
The internal rate of return (IRR) can be used as a measure of firm growth. Mason and Harrison (2000), 
among others, suggest that the investment projects business angels make yield high returns. Mason and 
Harrison (2000) found that the distribution of returns was highly skewed. 34% of exits were made with 
total loss and 13% at partial loss or break-even, but 23% gained an IRR of 50% or above. They studied 
also how the rates of returns differed between business angels and portfolio managers that invested in 
seed stage and startup companies. Business angels had significantly fewer investments that generated 
negative returns and a significantly higher proportion that broke even or generated moderate returns 
(0–49% IRR) than portfolio managers had. 
Deriving conclusions from the above studies, business angel investments can be viewed as highly risky 
but when successful, the profits are extremely worthwhile. According to Hunter and Clarke (2009), an 
appealing aspect of early-stage investing is that the size of loss is only up to the total amount invested 
but the size of gain is genuinely uncapped.  
Hunter and Clarke (2009) found also that there are some key strategic choices that are significantly 
related to better investment outcomes. For the first, angels with entrepreneurial expertise 
outperformed those without it, especially in earlier-stage enterprises. For the second, more than half of 
the investments were very early-stage, going into pre-revenue ventures. For the third, the angels who 
invested in such enterprises where they had specific industry expertise failed significantly less. Also the 
angels who performed at least some due diligence experienced fewer failed investments. I think that 
these strategic choices presented above as well by Engel (2002), Berger and Udell (1998) and Gompers 
and Lerner (1999), relate closely to the business angel attributes that are presented as favorable 
features in the thesis.  
From literature, there can be found numerous studies that suggest venture financing to increase growth 
at the firm level. This include Manigart and Van Hyfte (1999), Engel and Keilbach (2007), Jain and Kini 
(1995) and Colombo and Grilli (2008), among others (Wright and Chopraa 2009). However, there are 
also studies that suggest there to be no effect at all. These include Burgel et al. (2000) and Botazzi and 
Da Rin (2002) among others (Wright and Chopraa 2009). Despite the mixed results, there are convincing 
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results in the empirical research indicating that venture financing enhances firm growth. That is also the 
conclusion of the thesis.  
5.3 The macro level evidence on the superior performance of business angel 
backed firms 
A research by Alemany and Marti (2005) intended to confirm the following intuition: firms that receive 
venture capital have a greater economic impact than similar firms financed with other kinds of capital, 
and that venture capital financing has significant and positive effect on this greater economic impact. In 
their research, the economic impact is measured by the development of some economic variables in 
venture capital firms. In particular, employment, sales, gross margin, total assets, net intangible assets 
and corporate taxes are the possible variables that could capture the economical impacts. Net intangible 
assets are included in the study since they can be used as a measure of innovations. Indeed, in 
numerous studies innovations are assumed to exhibit the growth in the new firm sector.  
The results from the analysis are convincing. They confirm the superior economic impact of venture 
capital backed companies in all variables analyzed, except for corporate taxes, compared to the control 
group (it is natural that during high growth taxable income reduces significantly). The annual growth 
rates of the studied variables during the time period venture investors were involved with the firm are 
(in brackets the growth numbers for the control group): sales 23,8% (8,1%), gross margin 18,8% (5,2%), 
total assets 26,1% (8,3%), intangible assets 45,8% (21,5%) and employment 19% (2,3%). All the results 
are significant either at the 1% or 5% levels except for total assets and employment in the startup stage 
companies.  
 Alemany and Marti (2005) analyzed also how the impact of venture capitalists differed across different 
stages of firm development. The biggest effects were in the group “startup”. The only variable that 
experienced larger values in the “growth stage” group compared to the startup was total assets. They 
did not find differences in measured variables between the control group and the venture capital 
backed enterprise in group “late stage”. Thus it is a well-grounded argument that venture capitalists add 
value the most in microenterprises.  
The main goal Alemany and Marti (2005) pursued was to empirically prove that venture capital backed 
companies have a greater impact on aggregate economic growth than firms financed with other sources 
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of capital. The results are convincing: the coefficient of the GDP’s natural logarithm is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. The empirical model found a significant and positive relation between the 
cumulative venture capital investment and the growth in the analyzed variables. 
To sum up, Alemany and Marti (2005) found evidence that employment, sales, gross margin, total 
assets, intangible assets and corporate taxes grow faster in firms that receive venture capital. The result 
is verified as a higher growth rates in those variables in a sample of venture capital backed companies, 
over a three-year period, comparable to non-venture capital backed firms. Also, the empirical model 
found a significant, positive relation between the cumulative venture capital investment in a firm and 
the growth in employment, sales, gross margin, total assets, intangible assets and corporate taxes in the 
aggregate economy. 
The European Central Bank conducted a study that investigated how private equity investments affect 
new business creation in Europe. The researchers, Popov and Roosenboom (2009), took advantage of a 
comprehensive database of European firms in order to study how firm entry rate is affected by private 
equity investments. The researchers used cross-country cross-industry regression analysis. Data on entry 
of new firms was gathered from Amadeus and on private equity investment from European Venture 
Capital Association (EVCA).  
Popov and Roosenboom (2009) found that the coefficient on the interaction term between private 
equity investment and the birth of new enterprises was significantly positive. According to the 
researchers, the result implies that the entry of new firms in naturally high-entry and R&D-intensive 
industries is significantly higher in countries that have larger amounts of private equity investments 
relative to the gross domestic product. They argue that the result is particularly true for smaller firms.  
6. Conclusions 
6.1 Microenterprises and new knowledge as the explanatory factors of economic 
growth 
The aim of the thesis was to argue that today the traditional neoclassical growth theory, the Solow 
model and the more modern one, the endogenous growth theory, incompletely take into account 
economic growth drivers. The Solow model as well the endogenous growth theory does not take into 
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account the mechanism that transforms new knowledge into commercial opportunities. The mechanism 
that takes advantage of the spilled over knowledge is a new enterprise. The modified version of the 
endogenous growth theory, the endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship proposes that new 
enterprises are needed to take advantage of the new knowledge: without enterprises that emerge, take 
on risks, pursue opportunities and profits and sometimes exit, economies are unable to utilize new 
innovations and knowledge.  
In the endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship knowledge filter creates entrepreneurial 
opportunities. The knowledge filter depicts the assumptions that not all knowledge is commercially 
useful and that there are some individuals in a society that are able to utilize the knowledge. The 
personal attributes of individuals affect their possibilities to draw from the new knowledge. 
The following conclusion is made in the thesis: the neoclassical growth models and the endogenous 
growth theory do not measure economic growth today properly since the underlying assumptions do 
not depict the reality. On the other hand, the endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship has 
altered the faulty assumptions. The altered assumptions seem to be relevant and properly reflecting the 
economic conditions. The production of knowledge, the attributes of the produced knowledge, the 
knowledge filter and the assumption regarding knowledge spillovers as well entrepreneurs are built in 
the model. These are all such elements that are related to the innovation and entrepreneurial processes 
that depict microenterprise sector today. 
However, the endogenous growth theory of entrepreneurship does not take into account the decision 
process of becoming an entrepreneur. It is a revolutionary decision that a current employee has to make 
and there are many factors affecting the result of that decision. The model also lacks the policy actions 
and other environmental issues that could influence the surroundings the enterprise is working in. Also, 
the financial difficulties that the new enterprises face have undoubtedly impact on the economical 
performance both at the firm and the economy level. In the models depicting new enterprises such 
variable that measures the financial environment could be very advantageous for the explanatory 
strength of the model. Thus, new variable should be added in the model: ƒ that measures the impact 
that the financial situation has on the rate at which new enterprises are born and on their survival.    
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6.2 The contribution of business angels on the growth rate of microenterprises 
and ultimately on national economies 
As noted by literature and empirical research, microenterprises are an important source of economic 
growth. However, problems arise when the microenterprises are seeking for investment capital that is a 
necessary condition for the microenterprises to grow. Commercial banks and venture capital institutions 
that usually provide investment capital for more established enterprises refuse to lend to 
microenterprises. The reasons behind the refusal have to do with the extremely high risk level that such 
enterprises have and also with the lack of collaterals and cash buffers.  
Without business angels, microenterprises would be unable to receive capital and grow. As the thesis 
proposes, business angels provide the necessary capital and in addition, their accumulated human and 
social capital. The business angel characteristics and the value added roles they perform in the investee 
firms enhance the firm growth rate. As a conclusion, economies would grow with much higher rates if 
business angels and entrepreneurs would find each other with higher probabilities. Also the opposite is 
true: if there are no business angels that provide financing and human capital, there is much less growth 
in nations. 
The value added business angels contribute to the investee enterprises arises from the strong business 
knowhow. Business angels do not often participate with enterprises on a daily basis. Rather they 
concentrate on giving advice in the strategic matters and on providing both capital and their social 
network for the enterprise when needed.  
Business angels have the potential to enhance the efficiency of the financial markets and to fulfill the 
deficiencies in knowledge. Business angels are also able to enhance the economic performance of the 
investee firms. The only problem is that there are not many such enterprises that are willing to grow.  
Indeed, the Finnish enterprises regard growth negatively since the entrepreneurs tend to be risk averse. 
Thus the potential of business angels will be utilized in the Finnish economy only when the enterprises 
are utilizing their growth potential. These are clearly such points that should be addressed by those 
authorities that are concerned with the Finnish economic development. 
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6.3 Future research suggestions 
The research on business angel investments is young. Much of the literature describes the phenomenon 
and since the business angel sector is highly anonymous, there is very little empirical research. The 
problems with biasness also decrease the number of remarkable studies in the field. Thus to depict a 
better and more comprehensive picture of business angel activities and their consequences, more 
relevant and reliable empirical research is needed, especially at the macro level. Also the theoretical 
perspective of the micro and macro level actions and impacts is not yet clear. 
Although there are studies regarding the micro effects business angels have, the effects are measured 
only at most at the medium-term. The young nature of the business angel research affects the term that 
the effects can be measured. Thus an obvious future research target should be the long-term effects 
business angels have on the investee enterprises. 
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